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The Role of Courts in the Evolution of  
Standard Form Contracts:  
An Insurance Case Study 
Daniel Schwarcz* 
Standard form contracts are a pervasive feature of modern 
commercial life—for ordinary consumers and big businesses alike. 
Yet remarkably little is currently known about how and when 
these contracts evolve in response to judicial decisions that 
interpret and apply them in individual disputes. Homeowners 
insurance policies offer a particularly fertile ground for studying 
this issue due to both the prominence of the insurance law doctrine 
that ambiguities are interpreted against the drafter and the 
historic standardization of insurance policies across different 
insurers. Utilizing a unique hand-collected dataset, this Article 
empirically investigates the links between innovation in the 
dominant “ISO HO3” homeowners policy and published caselaw 
interpreting that contract. The results demonstrate that judicial 
caselaw has indeed played a vital role in the evolution of 
homeowners insurance policies over the last fifty years, forcing 
insurers to spell out their obligations more precisely and clearly. 
Notably, judicially prompted changes to policy language have 
often expanded coverage, suggesting that judicial scrutiny can 
empower regulators and market intermediaries to secure drafting 
concessions in revisions to homeowners policies. Normatively, 
these results provide strong support for insurance law’s central 
doctrine that ambiguities are interpreted against the drafter. 
When considered in light of prior research demonstrating that 
some homeowners insurers have recently begun departing from 
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the ISO HO3 policy in ways that systematically restrict coverage, 
this Article’s results also suggest that states should strongly 
consider requiring homeowners policies to provide coverage that 
is no less generous than the ISO HO3 policy. With respect to 
contract law more generally, the Article’s findings suggest that 
contractual innovation, particularly when prompted by caselaw, 
operates quite differently in different market and 
regulatory settings. 
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Standard form contracts are a pervasive feature of modern 
commercial life—for ordinary consumers and big businesses alike.1 
Yet remarkably little is currently known about how and when 
standard form contracts evolve in response to cases that interpret 
and apply them in individual disputes.2 To date, this relationship 
between caselaw and the evolution of standard form contracts has 
principally been studied in two narrow domains: sovereign bond 
contracts3 and end user license agreements (EULAs).4 With respect 
to a number of key issues—such as how and when contract terms 
change in response to judicial pressures—these studies have 
yielded contrasting results.5 Just as importantly, these studies have 
left unanswered a range of key issues regarding the role of courts 
in prompting contractual innovation, such as the extent to which 
judicially triggered revisions to standard form contracts 
systematically favor drafters or contract adherents.  
This Article aims to make progress in answering these pivotal 
questions for contract law by examining the issue in a new setting: 
insurance. Insurance contracts offer a particularly fertile ground  
for studying the interplay between contractual innovation and 
 
 1. See Todd D. Rakoff, Contracts of Adhesion: An Essay in Reconstruction, 96 HARV. L. 
REV. 1173, 1226 (1983); W. David Slawson, Standard Form Contracts and Democratic Control of 
Lawmaking Power, 84 HARV. L. REV. 529, 546 (1971); MARGARET JANE RADIN, BOILERPLATE: 
THE FINE PRINT, VANISHING RIGHTS, AND THE RULE OF LAW 33–53, 123–42 (2013). 
 2. Some studies have found that even terms that courts have found unenforceable 
are nonetheless included in many consumer contracts. See Meirav Furth-Matzkin, On the 
Unexpected Use of Unenforceable Contract Terms: Evidence from the Residential Rental Market, 9 J. 
LEGAL ANALYSIS 1, 3 (2017); Meirav Furth-Matzkin, The Harmful Effects of Unenforceable 
Contract Terms: Experimental Evidence, 70 ALA. L. REV. 1031, 1035 (2019). 
 3. See also Marcel Kahan & Michael Klausner, Standardization and Innovation in 
Corporate Contracting (or “The Economics of Boilerplate”), 83 VA. L. REV. 713, 725 (1997) 
(examining contractual innovation in the context of bond covenants). See generally Stephen J. 
Choi & G. Mitu Gulati, Innovation in Boilerplate Contracts: An Empirical Examination of 
Sovereign Bonds, 53 EMORY L.J. 929 (2004) (studying innovation in sovereign bonds); Stephen 
J. Choi, Mitu Gulati & Eric A. Posner, The Dynamics of Contract Evolution, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 
(2013) (same). 
 4. See generally Florencia Marotta-Wurgler & Robert Taylor, Set in Stone? Change and 
Innovation in Consumer Standard-Form Contracts, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 240 (2013) (studying 
changes to end user license agreements over time); Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci & Florencia 
Marotta-Wurgler, Learning in Standard Form Contracts: Theory and Evidence (N.Y.U. Ctr. for L., 
Econ. & Org., Working Paper No. 18-11, 2018) (same). 
 5. See infra Part I. 
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caselaw, for two central reasons.6 First, insurance policies have 
traditionally been drafted by a private entity known as the 
Insurance Services Office (ISO), resulting in the rough 
standardization of insurance policies across different insurance 
companies.7 Although some insurers have recently begun utilizing 
their own proprietary policies, most insurers continue to rely on 
forms that hew closely to the ISO model.8 Second, the central 
doctrine of insurance law—that ambiguities are interpreted against 
the drafter—potentially creates strong incentives for insurers to  
re-draft their policy terms in response to caselaw.9 
In studying how and when insurance policies evolve in 
response to judicial pressures, this Article focuses on one of the 
most important types of ISO policies: the HO3 homeowners 
insurance policy. This homeowners policy provides “open peril” 
property insurance against risk to an insured’s home, “named 
peril” coverage of the insured’s personal property, and liability 
insurance against suits alleging certain types of bodily injury or 
 
 6. To be sure, like any contractual setting, insurance contracts also raise their own 
unique complications. Perhaps most importantly, state insurance regulation constrains the 
terms of homeowners insurance policies in various significant ways. See generally KENNETH 
S. ABRAHAM & DANIEL SCHWARCZ, INSURANCE LAW AND REGULATION 150–54 (7th ed. 2020). 
Policy form regulation typically occurs through a prior approval process, whereby insurers 
and ISO file proposed base policies and endorsements with the insurance department, which 
must approve them before they may be used. Robert L. Tucker, Disappearing Ink: The 
Emerging Duty to Remove Invalid Policy Provisions, 42 AKRON L. REV. 519, 577 (2009). During 
this review process, state regulators ostensibly review the forms to determine whether they 
are “unfair,” “ambiguous,” “unreasonable,” “contrary to public policy,” or some 
combination of these broad standards. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 27-14-9 (LexisNexis 2014);  
GA. CODE ANN. § 33-24-10 (2013); NEB. REV. STAT. § 44-7513 (2010). The actual extent of this 
type of review varies significantly by state and type of filing. For instance, ISO submissions 
get substantially more attention because of how many carriers use all or some of ISO Forms. 
Additionally, regulators review filed policy forms to ensure that they comply with various 
state-specific rules. This type of “check-the-box” regulatory review is more commonly 
enforced, though even here state insurance regulation is quite uneven. Section IV.A, infra, 
discusses how rate regulatory review and ISO’s participation in this process impacts the 
implications of the Paper’s findings. As is relevant here, regulatory form review presumably 
slows innovation by creating extra costs for such innovation (i.e. the costs of negotiating with 
regulators) for approval. 
 7. See Daniel Schwarcz, Reevaluating Standardized Insurance Policies, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 
1263, 1270–72 (2011) [hereinafter Schwarcz, Reevaluating]. 
 8. See id. at 1314 (finding that “five carriers among the sixteen studied employ 
policies that are substantially less generous than the [ISO] HO3 policy” and that all five are 
national in scope and rely on captive agent distribution systems). 
 9. See Michelle Boardman, Penalty Default Rules in Insurance Law, 40 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 
305, 305 (2013) [hereinafter Boardman, Penalty Default Rules]. 
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property damage.10 The majority of American homeowners pay 
hundreds, if not thousands, of dollars a year for the promises 
contained in homeowners insurance policies that are nearly or 
completely identical to the ISO HO3 policy.11  
The Article’s empirical analysis of this industry standard 
homeowners policy proceeds in two phases. The first, and more 
straightforward, component of the analysis systematically tracks 
the evolution of each of the hundreds of terms within the ISO HO3 
policy since its inception approximately fifty years ago.12 During 
that time, the ISO HO3 policy has undergone major revisions five 
times: in 1975, 1984, 1990, 1999, and 2010.13 To track the evolution 
of these policies, I break up each of these five versions of the ISO 
HO3 policy into hundreds of discrete terms.14 I then compare each 
term of each policy version to the corresponding term in the prior 
version, tracking every term that was changed in a policy revision 
and whether that change restricted coverage, expanded coverage, 
or had mixed results regarding the scope of coverage. This analysis 
demonstrates that the length and complexity of the standard form 
homeowners policy has increased substantially over time, but at a 
gradually decreasing rate.15 It also reveals that changes in standard 
policy language have expanded and restricted coverage in roughly 
equal measure. 
These findings set the stage for the Article’s empirical heart, 
which links changes in insurance policy provisions to caselaw that 
may plausibly have triggered those changes. To do so, I—along 
with a team of research assistants—first isolated each individual 
policy term that was materially altered in one of the five revisions 
to the ISO homeowners policy.16 For each of these material 
alterations, we then located all cases on Westlaw that quoted key 
words from the term that was revised and that had been published 
 
 10. See ABRAHAM & SCHWARCZ, supra note 6, at 196. 
 11. See Facts + Statistics: Homeowners and Renters Insurance, INS. INFO. INST., 
https://www.iii.org/fact-statistic/facts-statistics-homeowners-and-renters-insurance (last 
visited Nov. 29, 2020). 
 12. See infra Section II.B. 
 13. See text accompanying infra notes 121–27. 
 14. See infra Section II.B. 
 15. See infra Part III. 
 16. See infra Part III. 
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between the date of the revision and the date of the prior revision.17 
We then individually examined each of these cases and eliminated 
any cases where the published opinion suggested that the parties 
did not contest the meaning of the term. Having eliminated the 
false positives, we then recorded a variety of the remaining cases’ 
features, including the type of court that issued the opinion and the 
prevailing party. To provide a control measure against which to 
compare these results, we repeated this process for a random subset 
of policy terms that were not revised in the relevant ISO 
homeowners policy revision. As detailed below, the resulting data 
support a range of inferences regarding when and how caselaw 
interpreting insurance policy language prompts revisions to  
that language.18   
To be sure, this methodology has limitations. First, it focuses 
solely on correlations between changes in policy language and 
insurance coverage litigation, and it therefore cannot definitively 
establish causation. Although a causal link between published 
caselaw regarding a term’s meaning and that term’s subsequent 
revision is the most natural explanation for the findings, other 
explanations for this correlation are also plausible. For instance, it 
is possible that the very reason that a term is frequently litigated is 
because it is flawed in ways that would inevitably have prompted 
contractual change.19 Second, this approach focuses solely on 
identifying whether changes to policy language were potentially 
linked to caselaw, rather than the related question of whether 
policy terms were left unchanged notwithstanding relevant 
caselaw. Others have demonstrated that at least some insurance 
policy terms are indeed heavily litigated but nonetheless remain 
unchanged in insurers’ policies.20  
 
 17. We include buffer periods of two years on either end to account for potential time 
lags. See infra Part III. 
 18. For further methodological detail, see infra Section II.B. 
 19. See infra Section II.B. 
 20. In particular, Michelle Boardman and Christopher French have both written about 
the evolution of insurance policies over time, focusing on instances when insurers retain 
policy language that courts have criticized or that has effectively lost its meaning.  
See Michelle E. Boardman, Contra Proferentem: The Allure of Ambiguous Boilerplate, 104 MICH. 
L. REV. 1105, 1113–14, 1117 (2006) [hereinafter Boardman, Contra Proferentem] (arguing that 
insurers often choose not to redraft terms that courts have found ambiguous because they 
value the certainty produced by these rulings more than the costs associated with providing 
expanded coverage, particularly because they can pass these costs on to policyholders); 
Michelle E. Boardman, The Unpredictability of Insurance Interpretation, 82 LAW & CONTEMP. 
3.SCHWARCZ_FIN.NH (DO NOT DELETE)  3/11/2021  12:58 AM 
477 Role of Courts in the Evolution of Standard Form Contracts 
 477 
 
With these caveats in mind, the data suggest that judicial 
caselaw has indeed played a vital role in prompting material 
changes to the standard form homeowners policy throughout its 
approximately fifty-year evolution.21 Over this time, materially 
altered terms were linked to approximately twice as many cases 
interpreting their meaning as compared to unchanged terms.22 
These differences are statistically significant at a 99% confidence 
level when aggregated across all policy revision years.23  
The data also reveal a number of additional notable trends. 
First, caselaw appears to play an increasingly important role in 
prompting material changes to the homeowners policy; both the 
average number of cases linked to material modifications (relative 
to unchanged terms) and the overall percentage of material 
modifications that are linked to caselaw (also relative to unchanged 
terms) increased over time.24 Second, coverage-expanding 
modifications to policy language were no more likely to be linked 
to caselaw than the control group of unchanged terms.25 By 
contrast, both coverage-restricting modifications and modifications 
 
PROBS. 27, 29 (2019) (arguing that courts do not always appreciate that an insurance policy 
term found to be ambiguous may not be redrafted, may be impossible to redraft effectively, 
or may be redrafted in a way that harms consumers); Christopher C. French, Insurance 
Policies: The Grandparents of Contractual Black Holes, 67 DUKE L.J. ONLINE 40, 42–43 (2017) 
[hereinafter French, Insurance Policies] (arguing that four specific insurance policy terms—(1) 
“Sue and Labor” Clauses, (2) “Ensuing Loss” Clauses, (3) “Non-Cumulation” Clauses, and 
(4) the “Sudden and Accidental” Pollution Exclusion—constitute “contractual black holes” 
because they are used repeatedly in insurance policies notwithstanding the fact that they 
have lost any discernable meaning); Christopher C. French, Understanding Insurance Policies 
as Noncontracts: An Alternative Approach to Drafting and Construing These Unique Financial 
Instruments, 89 TEMP. L. REV. 535, 547–48 (2017); Christopher C. French, The Butterfly Effect in 
Interpreting Insurance Policies, 82 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 47, 47–49 (2019) (discussing various 
ways in which judicial interpretations of insurance policies can have ripple effects, including 
by prompting redrafting that may trigger new disputes); see also Stephen J. Choi, Mitu Gulati 
& Robert E. Scott, The Black Hole Problem in Commercial Boilerplate, 67 DUKE L.J. 1, 7 n.16 (2017) 
(speculating that insurance policies may in some cases contain contractual blackholes).   
See generally John F. Coyle, The Butterfly Effect in Boilerplate Contract Interpretation, 82 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. i (2019) (exploring the various ways in which judicial interpretations of 
contracts can have unexpected ripple effects, which may include prompting redrafting). 
 21. See infra Part III. 
 22. Depending on the revision year, each term that is materially changed is linked to 
an average of between 1.8 to 4.5 cases that are likely to have played a role in prompting the 
revision. By contrast, the average number of cases linked to unchanged terms ranged from 
.93 to 1.88 depending on the year. 
 23. See infra Section III.B. 
 24. See infra Section III.B. 
 25. See infra Section III.B. 
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with mixed effects on the scope of coverage were, on average, 
linked to more cases than the control group.26 Third, policyholders 
need not prevail in the majority of coverage disputes for  
those disputes to be linked to changed policy language.27  
However, policyholder success in at least one case during the 
relevant time period appears to be an important contributor to 
contractual change.28  
Collectively, these results suggest that courts play a pivotal role 
in forcing insurers to spell out their contractual relationship with 
policyholders more precisely.29 This revision process is apparently 
impacted by regulators, market intermediaries, or reputational 
concerns, as ISO regularly incorporates compromise terms into 
updated versions of their policies.30 Ultimately, then, the “penalty 
default” approach of insurance law—which penalizes drafters for 
ambiguities either by interpreting them in favor of coverage or by 
adopting a relatively policyholder-friendly default rule—seems to 
produce important and sensible long-term results in shaping 
ordinary consumers’ insurance coverage, at least for the majority of 
insurers that hew closely to the ISO HO3 form.  
The Article’s findings have additional normative implications 
when considered in light of earlier research showing that 
homeowners policy forms that depart significantly from the ISO 
HO3 policy often systematically restrict coverage.31 In particular, 
the comparatively even-handed evolution of the ISO HO3 policy 
suggests that states should require homeowners policies to provide 
coverage that is no less generous than that contained within this 
 
 26. See infra Section III.B. 
 27. See infra Section III.B. 
 28. See infra Section III.B. 
 29. On penalty default rules in general, see Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps 
in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 97–100 (1989).  
On the use of penalty default rules in insurance, see Kenneth S. Abraham, A Theory of 
Insurance Policy Interpretation, 95 MICH. L. REV. 531, 545 (1997); Boardman, Penalty Default 
Rules, supra note 9; Tom Baker & Kyle D. Logue, Mandatory Rules and Default Rules in Insurance 
Contracts, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF INSURANCE LAW 377, 379–83 
(Daniel Schwarcz & Peter Siegelman eds., 2015). 
 30. See Daniel Schwarcz, Coverage Information in Insurance Law, 101 MINN. L. REV. 1457, 
1471–76 (2017) [hereinafter Schwarcz, Coverage Information] (providing several examples 
when insurers redrafted policy provisions in response to judicial determinations that a policy 
was ambiguous). 
 31. See Daniel Schwarcz, Reevaluating, supra note 7. 
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presumptive industry default policy.32 Adopting this approach 
would parallel states’ creation of a mandatory fire insurance policy 
in response to individual fire insurers hollowing out coverage from 
their policy more than a century ago.33 It would do so, however, by 
piggybacking on the evolution of the ISO HO3 policy in response 
to decades of caselaw and resulting revisions. 
Outside of the insurance domain, this Article’s findings support 
emerging research in the empirical contracts literature suggesting 
that the evolution of standard form contracts varies significantly 
across different contractual settings.34 The Article’s findings also 
suggest that the impact to consumers of contractual innovation 
generally, and judicially prompted innovation in particular, may 
depend on various market-specific factors, including the 
prominence of industry-wide standardized forms and the extent to 
which regulators and market actors can directly or indirectly 
influence the contract revision process.35  
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I provides a brief 
overview of the literature on the evolution of standard form 
contracts. Part II turns to the specific context of homeowners 
insurance policies, providing key background and laying out in 
detail the Article’s methodology for studying the role of caselaw in 
shaping the evolution of this vitally important consumer contract. 
The results of the empirical inquiry are presented in Part III. Finally, 
Part IV discusses the implications of these results both for insurance 
law specifically and for contract law more generally.  
 
 32. See infra Part IV. 
 33. See infra Section IV.A.2. 
 34. For instance, consumer-oriented standard form contracts like homeowners 
insurance policies and end user license agreements for software products may be relatively 
more likely to evolve in response to judicial pressures than sophisticated financial contracts. 
See Marotta-Wurgler & Taylor, supra note 4, at 240; Dari-Mattiacci & Marotta-Wurgler,  
supra note 4, at 4–5. 
 35. See John Coyle, A Short History of the Choice-of-Law Clause, 91 U. COLO. L. REV. 1147, 
1209 (2020) (“[T]he process of contractual change can vary depending upon a range of 
variables—including, but not limited to, the nature of the contract provision at issue, the type 
of agreement, the identity of the drafter, the geographic location where the contract is 
prepared, and the centralized or decentralized nature of the drafting community—and that 
a great deal depends upon context.”). 
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I. INNOVATION IN STANDARD FORM CONTRACTS  
In recent years, legal scholars have increasingly recognized the 
importance of understanding the processes by which contracts are 
drafted and redrafted over time. The resulting literature has found 
that certain sophisticated financial contracts are often resistant to 
change, even in the face of clearly relevant caselaw.36 At the same 
time, there is evidence that some types of contract terms—
particularly consumer-oriented contracts, like end user license 
agreements—can evolve relatively quickly in the face of relevant 
market, technological, or interpretive shocks. This Part briefly 
summarizes this literature, dividing the field between studies of 
sophisticated financial contracts and investigations of consumer-
oriented standard form contracts. 
A. Innovation in Sophisticated Commercial Contracts 
Legal scholars have devoted extensive attention to 
understanding the processes by which sophisticated commercial 
contracts like bond covenants evolve over time. This literature 
suggests that many of these contracts are resistant to change, even 
in the wake of important and clearly relevant legal, market, or 
technological developments.37 When sophisticated financial 
 
 36.  See infra note 37. 
 37. Contractual stickiness has perhaps been most clearly demonstrated in the context 
of sovereign bond contracts. See Stephen J. Choi, Mitu Gulati & Robert E. Scott, Variation in 
Boilerplate: Rational Design or Random Mutation?, 20 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 1, 17 (2018) 
(exploring reasons for the stickiness of the pari passu clause in sovereign bond contracts); 
Stephen J. Choi & G. Mitu Gulati, An Empirical Study of Securities Disclosure Practice, 80 TUL. 
L. REV. 1023, 1023 (2006); Choi & Gulati, supra note 3, at 945 (finding that it took 
approximately three years for New York issuances of sovereign bond contracts to adopt 
revised “unanimous action clauses” after Ecuador restructured its debt without achieving 
unanimous consent by creatively interpreting its contracts’ terms but that countries 
thereafter quickly herded towards new language); Choi, Gulati & Posner, supra note 3, at 1–
6. A number of studies have also examined these issues in the context of commercial bond 
contracts. See Kahan & Klausner, supra note 3, at 713. For instance, pari passu clauses were 
routinely included in sovereign bond contracts even though market participants held widely 
diverging views on the term’s meaning and holdout creditors had successfully invoked the 
clause to insist on preferential payouts in numerous sovereign debt restructurings. Even after 
a highly prominent case finally resolved the actual meaning of pari passu clauses in a case 
that many suggest upended the markets’ understanding of this clause, it took years for 
sovereign bond contracts to adjust their terms in response. See Anna Gelpern, Mitu Gulati & 
Jeromin Zettelmeyer, If Boilerplate Could Talk: The Work of Standard Terms in Sovereign Bond 
Contracts, 44 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 617, 621–23 (2019); see also John F. Coyle & Joseph M. Green, 
Contractual Innovation in Venture Capital, 66 HASTINGS L.J. 133, 133 (2014) (examining 
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contracts do eventually respond to legal or market developments, 
they often do so quickly and dramatically, as parties herd towards 
new standard terms.38 
There are numerous potential reasons that terms in financial 
contracts may be sticky, even in the wake of relevant judicial 
decisions impacting their meaning or implications.39 Perhaps the 
most frequently emphasized explanation is that standardized 
contract terms may result in positive network externalities.40 Under 
this theory, firms’ use of a particular contract term is more valuable 
to the extent that other firms have used that term in the past and 
continue to use that term in the future.41 Another explanation for 
contractual stickiness is that innovating firms generally cannot 
prevent rivals from free-riding on their drafting efforts, which 
reduces firms’ incentives to invest in revising contract language.42 
 
innovations in the contracts governing venture capital financing of Silicon Valley companies 
in the wake of technological shifts); Matthew Jennejohn, The Architecture of Contract 
Innovation, 59 B.C. L. REV. 71 (2018) (examining innovation M&A contracts and showing how 
this innovation often occurs through collaboration rather than through the use of structured 
modules); Robert Anderson & Jeffrey Manns, The Inefficient Evolution of Merger Agreements, 
85 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 57, 61 (2017) (arguing that innovation in merger agreements is highly 
path-dependent, resulting in “systematic inefficiencies in the acquisition agreement drafting 
process which raises costs and risk to clients”); Julian Nyarko, Stickiness and Incomplete 
Contracts (Feb. 24, 2020) (unpublished manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ 
papers.cfm?abstract_id=3446206. 
 38. See Choi & Gulati, supra note 3, at 933 (describing herding of parties to revised 
unanimous action clauses after issuance of Mexican bonds in 2003); see also Kahan & 
Klausner, supra note 3, at 713 (showing herding in event risk covenants, which protect 
bondholders from events like leveraged buyouts that could dilute their value). In some cases, 
sophisticated commercial parties herd around contractual language that is not suboptimal 
so much as meaningless. Such contractual black holes can occur when contracting parties 
routinely incorporate standardized boilerplate into their contracts that has not been litigated 
or otherwise subject to dispute. See Choi, Gulati & Scott, supra note 20, at 8–15. 
 39. See Peter B. Rutledge & Christopher R. Drahozal, “Sticky” Arbitration Clauses?  
The Use of Arbitration Clauses After Concepcion and Amex, 67 VAND. L. REV. 955, 977–83 (2014) 
(describing eleven different reasons why contracts may be sticky). 
 40. See id. (noting this is dominant theory/explanation for contract stickiness). 
 41. For instance, maintaining the same boilerplate as many other firms means that this 
language is likely to have a clear and predictable meaning in the marketplace and among 
courts. It also may reduce the costs of hiring future professional service providers who will 
be familiar with these terms and how they interact with other terms or issues. See Michael 
Klausner, Corporations, Corporate Law, and Networks of Contracts, 81 VA. L. REV. 757, 786–89 
(1995); see also Marcel Kahan & Michael Klausner, Path Dependence in Corporate Contracting: 
Increasing Returns, Herd Behavior and Cognitive Biases, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 347 (1996). 
 42. Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, The Limits of Expanded Choice: An Analysis of the 
Interactions Between Express and Implied Contract Terms, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 261, 286 (1985); 
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Other potential impediments to contractual innovation include the 
risk that redrafting may send a negative signal to third parties,43 
may result in agency costs for potential innovators like lawyers,44 
or may complicate the ability of markets to price and invest in the 
associated instruments.45  
Despite these impediments, the terms of sophisticated 
commercial contracts do of course change at times in response to 
market, technological, or judicial shocks.46 Market intermediaries 
often play a significant role in this evolution. Intermediaries like 
securities underwriters and trade organizations can overcome 
some of the collective action problems that ordinarily inhibit 
contractual evolution.47 For instance, they can communicate the 
perspectives of parties impacted by contract terms and pool the 
resources of competing firms to draft model contract terms.48 These 
terms can then potentially be quickly and widely adopted by 
numerous firms at once, thus overcoming network effects.49  
B. Innovation in Mass-Market Standard Form Consumer Contracts 
Consumer-oriented standard form contracts are, of course, 
drafted and agreed to in a much different set of circumstances than 
 
Avery Wiener Katz, Standard Form Contracts, in 3 THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF 
ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 502, 503 (Peter Newman ed., 1998). 
 43. See Omri Ben-Shahar & John A.E. Pottow, On the Stickiness of Default Rules,  
33 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 651, 655–60 (2006); Russell Korobkin, The Status Quo Bias and Contract 
Default Rules, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 608, 608 (1998). 
 44. See Claire A. Hill, Why Contracts Are Written in “Legalese,” 77 CHI.-KENT L. REV.  
59, 60 (2001). 
 45. See Gus De Franco, Florin P. Vasvari, Dushyantkumar Vyas & Regina Wittenberg-
Moerman, Similarity in the Restrictiveness of Bond Covenants, 29 EUR. ACCT. REV. 665, 665 (2020) 
(finding that “bonds with more similar covenant restrictiveness receive lower yields at 
issuance” and “are characterized by greater liquidity in the secondary market”). 
 46. See John C. Coates IV, Why Have M&A Contracts Grown? Evidence from Twenty Years 
of Deals (Harvard John M. Olin Ctr. for L., Econ., & Bus., Discussion Paper No. 889, 2016;  
Eur. Corp. Governance Inst., Law Working Paper No. 333/2016, 2016). 
 47. Kevin E. Davis, The Role of Nonprofits in the Production of Boilerplate, 104 MICH.  
L. REV. 1075, 1086 (2006). For instance, both the adoption and the abandonment of event risk 
covenants was driven by underwriters. By contrast, in sovereign debt contracts, the eventual 
market shift away from collective action clauses was driven by attorneys—particularly those 
working for issuers. See Marotta-Wurgler & Taylor, supra note 4, at 247. In-house counsel, in 
particular, may be more willing to push innovation than outside law firms because they 
experience more of the upside of such innovation. 
 48. See Kevin E. Davis, Contracts as Technology, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 83, 97 (2013). 
 49. See id. 
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sophisticated financial contracts. For this reason, it is hardly 
surprising that empirical research suggests that drafting parties 
select different types of terms in these two settings.50 Yet compared 
to the literature examining innovation of sophisticated financing 
contracts, remarkably few studies examine contract innovation in 
mass-market standard form contracts. However, the studies of 
consumer-oriented standard form contracts that do exist 
suggest that these contracts may not always be as sticky as their 
commercial counterparts.  
The leading empirical studies of contractual innovation in the 
consumer context focus on mass-market end user license 
agreements (EULAs) for software products.51 In this setting, 
individual firms have often amended their contracts in response to 
a variety of considerations, including litigation outcomes.52 Firms 
appear to be more likely to revise EULA terms when they learn new 
information about the impact of those terms through customer and 
employee feedback or court decisions.53 On average, changes to 
EULA terms tend to be pro-seller and to result in longer contracts.54  
 
 50. See, e.g., Theodore Eisenberg, Geoffrey P. Miller & Emily Sherwin, Mandatory 
Arbitration for Customers but Not for Peers: A Study of Arbitration Clauses in Consumer and  
Non-consumer Contracts, 92 JUDICATURE 118, 118 (2008) (finding that firms are more likely to 
include mandatory arbitration provisions in consumer-oriented contracts than in their 
contracts with other large firms). 
 51. Marotta-Wurgler & Taylor, supra note 4, at 240; Dari-Mattiacci & Marotta-Wurgler, 
supra note 4. 
 52. Marotta-Wurgler & Taylor, supra note 4, analyzed changes in the EULAs of 247 
different companies in 2003 and 2010, focusing on 32 specific terms. They found that 
approximately 40% of firms materially changed at least one core term in these agreements, 
with some firms materially revising more than ten of the identified terms. In general, larger 
and growing firms were more likely to change their contracts during the study period. The 
study also found that one important driver of firms’ contract changes was published caselaw 
relevant to the enforceability of the underlying term. To reach this conclusion, it first 
attempted to measure the likelihood that a given term would be enforced by measuring the 
ratio of the cases enforcing a term to the total number of times that its enforceability was 
disputed in the caselaw. Acknowledging the limits of this approach, the article also focused 
on the impact of a single landmark case finding that one particular type of term in the study 
was enforceable. Under either approach, the analysis concluded that firms were more likely 
to adopt terms when those terms were more likely to be enforced by courts, and more likely 
to drop terms that courts were less willing to enforce. See id. 
 53. See Dari-Mattiacci & Marotta-Wurgler, supra note 4, at 4–5 (finding that sellers are 
more likely to revise EULA terms that offer an opportunity to learn). 
 54. See Marotta-Wurgler & Taylor, supra note 4, at 244. The extent of the pro-seller bias 
increased if terms that merely informed consumers of their rights without substantively 
altering those rights were excluded from the calculus. However, the spread in the pro-seller 
bias of contracts increased over the study’s time period, indicating decreased 
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Outside of the EULA studies, there is mixed evidence regarding 
the extent to which mass-market standard form contracts are sticky. 
For instance, in the wake of several high-profile Supreme Court 
cases limiting state efforts to restrict pre-dispute arbitration clauses 
and class action waivers,55 many commentators speculated that 
firms would dramatically increase their usage of these terms.56 
However, a study of franchise agreements found that only a small 
number of firms amended their contracts to include these terms.57   
As a theoretical matter, there are various reasons to suspect that 
certain types of mass-market consumer contracts may be relatively 
less sticky than sophisticated commercial contracts. For instance, 
firms may have more opportunities to learn about the impact of 
terms in consumer-oriented contracts, which are used in so many 
more transactions than sophisticated financial contracts.58 
Alternatively, firms may be better able to coordinate changes to 
standardized consumer contracts because these contracts can 
 
standardization of terms over time as some subset of firms revised their contracts to become 
more consumer friendly. Id. at 261. Meanwhile, younger firms, growing firms, and firms with 
in-house counsel were more likely to change their contracts in a pro-seller direction. Id. 
 55. See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333 (2011) (holding that the 
Federal Arbitration Act preempts state court decisions invalidating class arbitration waivers 
as unconscionable); Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 570 U.S. 228 (2013) (holding that 
arbitral class action waivers were enforceable notwithstanding the possibility that such 
waivers might make it economically infeasible to secure relief). 
 56. See, e.g., Myriam Gilles & Gary Friedman, After Class: Aggregate Litigation  
in the Wake of AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 623, 629 (2012);  
Jean R. Sternlight, Tsunami: AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion Impedes Access to Justice,  
90 OR. L. REV. 703, 718 (2012). 
 57. See Rutledge & Drahozal, supra note 39, at 955–56. The study focused on two 
samples of franchise agreements to determine whether arbitration clauses or class action 
waivers became more common in franchise agreements in the two years after Concepcion was 
published in 2011. It found that only a small number of firms changed their contracts to 
include arbitration clauses, with the percentage of such firms increasing between 1% and 5%, 
depending on the sample. Among the firms that did use arbitration clauses, there was a 
larger percentage increase in firms that also included a class action waiver (from 78% to 87%). 
See id. at 990–91. As the authors suggest, one plausible reason for the lack of a shift to class 
action waivers is that firms preferred this outcome given the low risk of class action lawsuits 
and the possibility that franchisors valued the option of being able to litigate disputes with 
franchisees. Id. at 986. Moreover, in a supplemental analysis to evaluate the possibility of 
stickiness as an explanation for their findings, the authors report that approximately 80% of 
firms changed at least one of their contract terms in either 2011 or 2012 and approximately 
10% of firms changed at least 10 of their terms in at least one of the two years. See id. at 1004. 
 58. See Dari-Mattiacci & Marotta-Wurgler, supra note 4. See generally David A. 
Hoffman, Relational Contracts of Adhesion, 85 U. CHI. L. REV. 1395 (2018) (exploring how firms 
may change their contracts after interacting with consumers). 
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frequently be changed unilaterally, with minimal costs or 
opposition from consumers.59 
II. INVESTIGATING INNOVATION OF HOMEOWNERS 
INSURANCE POLICIES 
Each year, millions of consumers purchase homeowners 
insurance policies to protect their homes, possessions, and wealth. 
These contracts constitute the sole consideration that consumers 
receive in exchange for their upfront payment of hundreds or 
thousands of dollars in premiums.60 Homeowners insurance 
policies are consequentially of vital importance to domestic 
commerce. But as Section A of this Part makes clear, homeowners 
policies are also drafted and revised within an institutional and 
legal context that makes them a particularly interesting subject for 
studying contractual innovation. In particular, many insurers use 
contracts that largely or completely replicate an industry-wide 
standard form, and the dominant mode of insurance policy 
interpretation is specifically designed to prompt clarification of 
what is covered by these contracts. With this context in mind, 
Section B develops a two-phase methodology for studying the role 
of courts in the innovation of the presumptive industry standard 
homeowners policy. Phase One consists of systematically tracking 
the development of the hundreds of terms and conditions within 
the ISO homeowners policy across each of its five major revisions 
over the last roughly fifty years. Phase Two then attempts to link 
changes to these terms to relevant caselaw regarding the meaning 
of the changed term. 
A. Key Factors Potentially Impacting Innovation of 
Homeowners Policies 
Like all contracts, homeowners insurance policies are drafted 
and revised within a distinct institutional and legal context. Two 
elements of this context are particularly noteworthy in 
understanding the process by which the homeowners policy has 
 
 59. See David Horton, The Shadow Terms: Contract Procedure and Unilateral Amendments, 
57 UCLA L. REV. 605, 648–53 (2010) (exploring ways in which companies can unilaterally 
amend the terms of consumer-oriented contracts in ways that consumers rationally ignore). 
 60. See Daniel Schwarcz, A Products Liability Theory for the Judicial Regulation of 
Insurance Policies, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1389, 1404 (2007). 
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evolved over the last half-century.61 First, until recently, virtually 
all insurers selling homeowners coverage in the United States used 
a policy form that nearly or completely replicated the Insurance 
Services Office’s (ISO) model HO3 form.62 Second, the dominant 
interpretive rule of insurance law—that ambiguities are interpreted 
against the drafter—is specifically designed to prompt insurers to 
clarify ambiguous policy language.63 Taken together, these two 
factors suggest that insurance policies may be less sticky than other 
types of standard form contracts.  
1. The evolution of the ISO HO3 policy 
The standardization of the homeowners policy dates back to the 
mid-twentieth century.64 Until the 1950s, insurers typically sold 
packages of property insurance forms to insureds, each of which 
covered individual perils, like fire, wind, and burglary.65 Although 
some insurers experimented with selling multi-line policies in the 
1930s and ’40s, these efforts were variable and generally did not 
 
 61. Also noteworthy is the fact that insurance policies are subject to an unusual, if not 
unique, state regulatory regime. See supra note 6. 
 62. See Thomas L. Wenck, The Historical Development of Standard Policies, 35 J. RISK & 
INS. 537, 541 (1968); Michelle Boardman, Insuring Understanding: The Tested Language Defense, 
95 IOWA L. REV. 1075, 1091 (2010) [hereinafter Boardman, Tested Language Defense] (describing 
the “hyperstandardization” of insurance policies); Susan Randall, Freedom of Contract in 
Insurance, 14 CONN. INS. L.J. 107, 125 (2008) (“[I]n some lines of insurance, all insurance 
companies provide identical coverage on the same take-it-or-leave-it basis.”); JEFFREY W. 
STEMPEL, 1 LAW OF INSURANCE CONTRACT DISPUTES § 4.06[b], at 4-37 (2d ed. Supp. 2005); 
Kenneth S. Abraham, A Theory of Insurance Policy Interpretation, 95 MICH. L. REV. 531, 543 
(1996); Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The McCarran-Ferguson Act of 1945: 
Reconceiving the Federal Role in Insurance Regulation, 68 N.Y.U. L. REV. 13, 18 (1993); James M. 
Fischer, Why Are Insurance Contracts Subject to Special Rules of Interpretation?: Text Versus 
Context, 24 ARIZ. STATE L.J. 995, 996 (1992) (“The only part of the standard policy that is 
generally customized to the consumer-insured is the Declaration Sheet . . . . [T]here is little, 
if any, freedom to negotiate the standardized language of the insurance contract that 
determines the scope of coverage.”); Kent D. Syverud, The Duty to Settle, 76 VA. L. REV.  
1113, 1153 (1990) (“But automobile and property owner’s liability insurance contracts  
are standardized across insurers in a form few insureds have the power or experience to 
bargain around.”). 
 63. See, e.g., Boardman, Penalty Default Rules, supra note 9, at 305.  
 64. See generally INS. SERVS. OFF., HOMEOWNERS INSURANCE: THREATS FROM WITHOUT, 
THREATS FROM WITHIN (1996) [hereinafter ISO, THREATS FROM WITHOUT]; Eugene L. 
Lecomte, History of the Property Insurance Policy, 40 CHARTERED PROP. & CAS. UNDERWRITERS 
J. 226 (1987). 
 65. See ISO, THREATS FROM WITHOUT, supra note 64. 
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include liability insurance.66 By the 1950s, however, insurers 
increasingly realized that consumers were attracted to multi-line, 
bundled policies that offered protection from a range of risks 
associated with home ownership.67  
Individual insurers’ efforts to offer such bundled coverage 
faced two key hurdles, however. First, insurers’ experimentation 
with bundled homeowners policies often confused consumers, 
state regulators, and insurance agents.68 This experimentation also 
prompted concern that the fine print within complicated policy 
forms would not match the coverage that insurers were 
marketing.69 Indeed, competing insurers’ hollowing out of 
coverage within their policies’ fine print had prompted many states 
to require decades earlier that fire insurance policies conform to 
prescribed models detailed in statute or regulation.70 Second, 
individual insurers that experimented with unique bundled 
homeowners policies faced difficulties in accurately predicting 
future losses.71 Insurers had long relied on aggregate loss data to 
help predict losses: such data were much more robust than any 
individual insurer’s loss data, and hence much more reliable.72 But 
such industry-wide data became less reliable as insurers combined 
historically distinct coverages, especially as they altered these 
coverages to nest together.73  
To address these problems, insurers formed the national  
Multi-Line Insurance Rating Bureau (MLIRB) in 1964.74 The 
primary goal of this organization was to develop and maintain 
standardized multi-peril forms.75 The insurer-developed rating 
agency thereafter published a series of multi-line peril policies for 
 
 66. See id. 
 67. See id. See generally Jeffrey W. Stempel, Rediscovering the Sawyer Solution: Bundling 
Risk for Protection and Profit, 11 RUTGERS J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 170 (2013). 
 68. See ISO, THREATS FROM WITHOUT, supra note 64. 
 69. See id. 
 70. See George W. Goble, The Moral Hazard Clauses of the Standard Fire Insurance Policy, 
37 COLUM. L. REV. 410, 410 (1937). 
 71. See ABRAHAM & SCHWARCZ, supra note 6. 
 72. See Daniel Schwarcz, Ending Public Utility Style Rate Regulation in Insurance,  
35 YALE J. ON REGUL. 941 (2018). 
 73. See id. 
 74. See ISO, THREATS FROM WITHOUT, supra note 64, at 49. See generally Curtis M. 
Elliott, The Best Insurance for Your Home and Belongings, CHANGING TIMES: KIPLINGER MAG., 
July 1966, at 17, 17–20. 
 75. See ISO, THREATS FROM WITHOUT, supra note 64. 
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homeowners, which it labeled HO1, HO2, HO3, etc.76 The rating 
agency continually tweaked these policies through the late 1960s in 
response to feedback from a variety of groups. Nonetheless, these 
versions of homeowners insurance policies were criticized by 
stakeholders as excessively confusing and technical.77  
In 1971, the insurance industry founded ISO as a national, non-
profit, unincorporated association of insurers to replace the prior 
patchwork of rate-making bureaus, including the MLIRB.78 As one 
of its first major initiatives, ISO created a task force to redraft the 
MLIRB’s homeowners policies.79 In 1975 ISO completed these 
revisions, which it unveiled a year later as part of the organization’s 
larger 1976 Homeowners Program.80 The updated homeowners 
policies were designed to simplify and streamline the MLIRB’s 
homeowners policies and retained the designations of HO1, HO2, 
HO3, etc.81 Throughout the early and mid-1980s, the ISO HO3 
policy increasingly came to dominate the market for homeowners 
coverage, with alternative forms in the program (like the HO1 and 
HO2) fading in popularity.82 Subsequently, ISO published major 
updates to the ISO HO3 policy form in 1984, 1990, 1999, and 2010.83  
ISO’s internal process for updating insurance policy forms has 
changed dramatically over the last fifty years. Prior to 1994, ISO 
was controlled by its member insurers, which included 
approximately 1,400 U.S. property and casualty insurers.84 
 
 76. See ISO, THREATS FROM WITHOUT, supra note 64. The original Homeowners 
Program had just three options, which were the predecessors of the later HO1, HO2, and 
HO5. By the mid- to late 1960s (if not earlier), the Homeowners Program had expanded to 
five options, including the predecessor of HO3, which had to be taken together with option 
4—a personal property coverage that could be bought separately by renters, for instance.  
See MULTI-LINE INSURANCE RATING BUREAU, HOMEOWNERS POLICY PROGRAM (1970). 
 77. See ISO, THREATS FROM WITHOUT, supra note 64. 
 78. See D.C. DEP’T OF INS., SEC. & BANKING, REPORT OF EXAMINATION AS OF DECEMBER 
31, 2011: EXAMINATION REPORT PREPARED BY INDEPENDENT CONTRACTORS OF RISK AND 
REGULATORY CONSULTING, LLC WITH REGARD TO THE MULTI-STATE MARKET CONDUCT 
EXAMINATION OF ISO, 2–4 (2013) [hereinafter ISO EXAMINATION REPORT]. 
 79. See ISO, THREATS FROM WITHOUT, supra note 64. 
 80. See id.; see also ROY C. MCCORMICK & WALLACE L. CLAPP, JR., HOMEOWNERS 76 
POLICY PROGRAM GUIDE (1979). 
 81. See ISO, THREATS FROM WITHOUT, supra note 64. 
 82. See id. 
 83. ISO has routinely published various endorsements that can be combined with base 
policies. In many cases, language from these endorsements has ultimately been incorporated 
into the base form during one of the major revisions. 
 84. See Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 772 (1993). 
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Consistent with this structure, its policy revision process was 
operated through committees of insurance representatives.85 On 
occasion, ISO would release supplemental documents explaining 
its rationales for specific policy revisions.86 In 1994, however, 
insurer control of ISO was limited as part of a settlement of a long-
standing federal antitrust lawsuit.87 ISO subsequently became an 
independent for-profit corporation in 1997, which is now owned by 
its parent company Verisk Analytics.88 Since that time, ISO has 
carefully guarded information about its internal procedures for 
updating insurance policy forms, providing only general 
information about this process, such as statements that it considers 
“input from insurers and producers.”89 
Although homeowners insurers historically used the ISO HO3 
form with minimal changes, some large modern insurers have 
developed proprietary policies that depart in substantial ways from 
this form.90 Many insurers—particularly smaller carriers—take the 
standard ISO HO3 policy form, place their own logo on it, and may 
even tweak the language occasionally.91 But all the important 
coverage provisions and exclusions are the same.92 Increasingly, 
however, a handful of national carriers substantially alter key terms 
of the ISO HO3 policy in their own policy forms.93 In most cases, 
but certainly not all, these changes systematically limit coverage.94  
 
 85. See id. at 773–76 (describing the process of competing insurers revising ISO’s 
CGL policy). 
 86. See, e.g., David A. Gauntlett, Recent Developments in Intellectual Property Law and 
Insurance, 30 TORT & INS. L.J. 503, 521–22 (1995). 
 87. ABRAHAM & SCHWARCZ, supra note 6, at 178. 
 88. See ISO EXAMINATION REPORT, supra note 78, at 3. 
 89. See ISO’s New Homeowners 2000 Insurance Program Overhauls Coverages to Reflect 
Court Decisions and Lifestyle Changes, VERISK (May 17, 2000) [hereinafter VERISK,  
Homeowners 2000],  https://www.verisk.com/archived/2000/iso-s-new-homeowners-2000-
insurance-program-overhauls-coverages-to-reflect-court-decisions-and-lifes/. 
 90. See Schwarcz, Reevaluating, supra note 7, at 1308–17. 
 91. See id. at 1314. 
 92. See id. 
 93. See id. at 1280–308. 
 94. See id. at 1308–17. 
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2. The penalty-default approach of insurance law 
Courts routinely state that ordinary principles of contract law 
guide the interpretation of insurance policy terms.95 Despite such 
sweeping proclamations, insurance policy interpretation is 
uniquely influenced by the contra proferentem canon, which is often 
described as the “first principle of insurance law.”96 Under this rule, 
ambiguities in insurance policy language are interpreted against 
the drafter, who is virtually always the insurer.97 According to most 
courts and commentators, the central rationale for contra 
proferentem is that it holds the potential to induce insurers to draft 
their insurance policies more clearly so as to avoid ambiguities.98 
In other words, the rule is intended to operate as a “penalty 
default rule.”99  
Contra proferentem is not the sole penalty default rule of 
insurance law. In fact, many, if not most, rules of insurance law can 
appropriately be classified as penalty default rules.100 Starting with 
the “default” nature of these rules, there is no doubt that most 
insurance law doctrines can be altered by clear and relevant 
language within the insurance policy.101 As for their status as 
“penalties,” many default rules of insurance law—ranging from 
those governing liability insurers’ duty to defend,102 concurrent 
 
 95. See, e.g., Interstate Fire & Cas. Co. v. Dimensions Assurance Ltd., 843 F.3d 133, 137 
(4th Cir. 2016); Naquin v. Elevating Boats, L.L.C., 817 F.3d 235, 238 (5th Cir. 2016);  
W.C. & A.N. Miller Dev. Co. v. Cont’l Cas. Co., 814 F.3d 171, 176 (4th Cir. 2016). 
 96. Abraham, supra note 62, at 531; see Fischer, supra note 62, at 996. 
 97. See JEFFREY W. STEMPEL & ERIK S. KNUTSEN, STEMPEL AND KNUTSEN ON INSURANCE 
COVERAGE 14-101 to -02 (2019); RESTATEMENT OF THE L. OF LIAB. INS. § 4 (AM. L. INST. 2019). 
 98. See Kenneth S. Abraham, Four Conceptions of Insurance, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 653,  
660 (2013); Baker & Logue, supra note 29, at 379–83; Boardman, Penalty Default Rules, supra 
note 9, at 318; Michael B. Rappaport, The Ambiguity Rule and Insurance Law: Why Insurance 
Contracts Should Not Be Construed Against the Drafter, 30 GA. L. REV. 171, 207–08 (1995); see also 
Neal-Pettit v. Lahman, 928 N.E.2d 421, 425 (Ohio 2010) (“Allstate, as the drafter, is 
responsible for ensuring that the policy states clearly what it does and does not cover.”). 
 99. Ayres & Gertner, supra note 29, at 91, 120 n.147. 
 100. Schwarcz, Coverage Information, supra note 30, at 1474. 
 101. See Baker & Logue, supra note 29, at 379–83; RESTATEMENT OF THE L. OF LIAB. INS. 
§ 1 (AM. L. INST. 2019). 
 102. See Charles Silver, Basic Economics of the Defense of Covered Claims, in RESEARCH 
HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF INSURANCE LAW 438 (Daniel Schwarcz & Peter Siegelman 
eds., 2015). 
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causation,103 or subrogation104—are arguably designed to provide 
relatively expansive coverage so as to prompt insurers that do not 
intend for these results to redraft their contracts accordingly.105  
Moreover, most of the penalty default rules of insurance law—
including both the general principle of contra proferentem and 
various more specific insurance law doctrines—have particular 
force when it comes to consumer-oriented insurance, like 
homeowners insurance policies.106 For instance, some courts have 
adopted a “sophisticated policyholder exception” to the contra 
proferentem rule.107 Others have suggested that, when it comes to 
insurance policies issued to ordinary consumers, contra proferentem 
applies irrespective of extrinsic evidence suggesting that the 
insurer maintained a relatively narrow understanding of 
ambiguous policy language.108  
There is no doubt that these penalty default rules of insurance 
law have indeed caused insurers to redraft portions of their 
homeowners insurance policies in response to unfavorable judicial 
opinions.109 For instance, ISO and insurers redrafted the HO3 
policy’s limited collapse exclusion multiple times in response to 
unfavorable judicial opinions.110 Similarly, the anti-concurrent 
causation language in the ISO HO3 policy has been redrafted on 
 
 103. Erik S. Knutsen, Confusion About Causation in Insurance: Solutions for Catastrophic 
Losses, 61 ALA. L. REV. 957 (2010). 
 104. Alan O. Sykes, Subrogation and Insolvency, 30 J. LEGAL STUD. 383 (2001). 
 105. See Schwarcz, Coverage Information, supra note 30, at 1474. 
 106. Oxford Realty Grp. Cedar v. Travelers Excess & Surplus Lines Co., 160 A.3d 1263, 
1271 (N.J. 2017) (“Similar to the doctrine of contra proferentem, the doctrine of reasonable 
expectations is less applicable to commercial contracts.”). 
 107. See In re Deepwater Horizon, 728 F.3d 491, 499 (5th Cir. 2013) (noting that while 
Texas has never recognized a sophisticated insured exception to contra proferentem, it has 
long recognized that this rule is “partially derivative of the unequal bargaining power typical 
in many negotiations over insurance contracts,” which might justify such an exception).  
See generally Hazel Glenn Beh, Reassessing the Sophisticated Insured Exception, 39 TORT TRIAL & 
INS. PRAC. L.J. 85 (2003); Jeffrey W. Stempel, Reassessing the “Sophisticated” Policyholder Defense 
in Insurance Coverage Litigation, 42 DRAKE L. REV. 807 (1993). 
 108. See, e.g., Winter v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 328 P.3d 665, 669 (Mont. 2014); 
Bidwell v. Shelter Mut. Ins. Co., 367 S.W.3d 585, 589 (Ky. 2012); Badger Mut. Ins. Co. v. 
Schmitz, 647 N.W.2d 223, 233–34 (Wis. 2002). 
 109. See ISO, THREATS FROM WITHOUT, supra note 64 (noting that changes in the 
language of the ISO homeowners insurance policy have frequently been motivated by court 
decisions producing results that were inconsistent with underwriters’ intent). 
 110. See Schwarcz, Coverage Information, supra note 30, at 1474; Rosen v. State Farm Gen. 
Ins. Co., 70 P.3d 351, 363–64 (Cal. 2003) (discussing policy language governing collapse that 
insurers specifically redrafted in response to prior adverse coverage determinations). 
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several occasions in response to cases finding coverage when 
insurers intended a different result.111 So too has the ISO HO3 
exclusion for water damage.112 Other isolated examples of insurer 
redrafting in apparent response to judicial decisions—both in the 
homeowners insurance policy and in other types of insurance 
policies—are not hard to locate. Moreover, ISO itself has noted on 
multiple occasions that it considers court decisions when updating 
insurance policy forms.113 
On the other hand, there are also numerous examples of 
insurers clinging to historic policy language that courts have 
repeatedly found either to be ambiguous or subject to a 
policyholder-friendly penalty default rule.114 Perhaps the most 
well-known examples involve the relatively sparse language in the 
liability section of the ISO HO3 policy (as well as many other 
liability insurance policies) governing insurers’ duty to defend 
cases alleging liability that may or may not ultimately result in 
coverage.115 Other examples of language in the homeowners policy 
that insurers have not redrafted in response to unfavorable court 
decisions include clauses governing ensuing loss116 and actual cash 
value recovery.117  
Insurers’ failure to re-draft terms that courts have previously 
found to be ambiguous or subject to policyholder-friendly default 
rules can be explained by several considerations. First, the very 
process of courts finding policy language to be ambiguous or 
 
 111. See 5 NEW APPLEMAN ON INSURANCE LAW LIBRARY EDITION § 53.04[1][b][i] (2020) 
(“Following judicial decisions that a homeowner’s policy covers a loss even where caused in 
part by an excluded peril, many standard homeowner’s insurance policies were revised to 
include anti-concurrent cause provisions.”). 
 112. See Charles M. Miller, ISO Changes Water Damage Exclusion in HO3: Is There  
Now Coverage for Storm Surge Under the 2000 Version?, 1 WHITE PAPER, 
https://www.uphelp.org/sites/default/files/ISO%20CHANGES%20WATER%20DAMA
GE%20EXCLUSION%20IN%20HO3.pdf (last accessed Jan. 23, 2021). 
 113. See, e.g., VERISK, Homeowners 2000, supra note 89 (“‘We came up with the new 
program after an extensive review of court rulings and lifestyle changes among an 
expanding and aging population,’ said Michael Fusco, ISO’s executive vice president — 
insurance services.”). 
 114. See Boardman, Contra Proferentem, supra note 20, at 1113–14, 1117; French, 
Insurance Policies, supra note 20, at 40. 
 115. See ABRAHAM & SCHWARCZ, supra note 6, at 615–16. 
 116. See id. at 266–67; see also Leep v. Trinity Universal Ins. Co., 261 F. Supp. 3d 1071, 
1085 (D. Mont. 2017); Bartram, LLC v. Landmark Am. Ins. Co., 864 F. Supp. 2d 1229,  
1232–33 (N.D. Fla. 2012). 
 117. See ABRAHAM & SCHWARCZ, supra note 6, at 284–87. 
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subject to a specific penalty default rule can result in that language 
taking on a settled and predictable judicially constructed meaning, 
which insurers can price in their subsequent policies.118 By contrast, 
redrafting policy language in response to judicial opinions can be 
risky due to the prospect that the redrafted policy language will 
yield results in coverage disputes that insurers did not anticipate. 
Second, redrafting policy language can be costly, both because 
redrafted policy language generally must be approved by state 
insurance regulators and because redrafting may result in courts 
making negative inferences about prior versions of policy language 
that may apply in ongoing disputes.119 
B. Methodology for Assessing the Role of Courts in the Evolution of the 
Homeowners Insurance Policy 
Assessing the role of caselaw in prompting innovation in the 
ISO HO3 homeowners policy requires two analytically distinct 
steps. The first, and more straightforward, step is to systematically 
track the evolution of this contract over time. The second, more 
complex, step is to assess the extent to which caselaw is likely to 
have played a significant role in prompting changes to terms when 
they occurred.  
1. Phase One: Tracking innovation in the ISO HO3 policy 
The first step in the empirical analysis involves systematically 
tracking the evolution of the ISO HO3 insurance policy, which has 
operated as the presumptive industry-wide policy since the early 
1980s.120 To do so, I first acquired from various libraries copies of 
the five major ISO revisions to the HO3 base policy form,121  
 
 118. See Boardman, Contra Proferentem, supra note 20, at 1113–14. 
 119. See JEFFREY W. STEMPEL, 1 STEMPEL ON INSURANCE CONTRACTS § 2.06[j], at 2-130 
(Aspen 3d ed. 2006) (“Changing the standard form insurance policy is a somewhat arduous 
process, requiring contributions from legal, claims, actuarial, and other industry personnel 
as well as from customers and state insurance regulators.”). 
 120. See ISO, THREATS FROM WITHOUT, supra note 64. 
 121. I did not include any of the myriad endorsements to these policies that ISO 
publishes. Some insurers will require that specific endorsements be included with their base 
policies. In some cases, this reflects local risks, state-specific practices, or individual insurers’ 
preferences. In other cases, mandatory endorsements become widespread among insurers 
nationally. When this occurs, the relevant provisions of the endorsements are sometimes 
incorporated into the base ISO policy at the time of the next major revision. 
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from 1975,122 1984,123 1990,124 1999,125 and 2010.126 I also secured a 
copy of ISO’s 1971 HO3 policy, which was drafted and revised by 
the organization’s predecessor, MLIRB, throughout the 1960s.127  
Having acquired these six versions of the HO3 policy, I then 
created a protocol for defining individual terms in each of these 
documents. To do so, I followed prior research by relying on the 
outline structure within the contracts themselves.128 In particular,  
I treated all language that was contained within the third outline 
level of each “Section” of the policies as individual terms.129 Thus, 
for example, B.8.a and B.8.b in the Definitions section were separate 
“terms.” However, where the policies broke down outline numbers 
or letters to the fourth outline level or beyond, the separate sections 
of the outline were treated as individual terms if, and only if, the 
aggregate number of lines in that section of the policy was ten or 
more. Thus, Sections B.1.a.1 and B.1.a.2 would be treated as 
separate terms if Section B.1.a contained ten or more lines of text 
in total.  
 
 122. HO3, ed. 12-75, INS. SERVS. OFF. (1975). 
 123. Homeowners 3: Special Form, ed. 4-84, INS. SERVS. OFF. (1984). 
 124. Homeowners 3: Special Form, HO 00 03 04 91, INS. SERVS. OFF. (1990). 
 125. Homeowners 3: Special Form, HO 00 03 10 00, INS. SERVS. OFF. (1999). 
 126. Homeowners 3: Special Form, HO 00 03 05 11, INS. SERVS. OFF. (2010). 
 127. HO3, ed. 9-71, INS. SERVS. OFF. (1971); see supra Section II.A. For the 1971 HO3 
policy, I included two endorsements that were intended to supplement this policy: (i) the 
standard New York fire insurance policy and (ii) an endorsement specifying the conditions 
of coverage. See INS. INFO. INST., SAMPLE INSURANCE POLICIES FOR PROPERTY AND LIABILITY 
COVERAGES: PREPARED FOR COLLEGE STUDENTS IN ADVANCED COURSES (1966). 
 128. See Schwarcz, Reevaluating, supra note 7. 
 129. The full protocol was as follows. First, each separate provision down to the third 
outline level of the policy “Sections” was treated as an individual term. Outline levels were 
generally apparent from the explicit outlining of the policy, such as B.8.a and B.8.b. In some 
cases, however, the outline level was implicit from the structure of the policy’s headings. 
Thus, the additional coverages on page 4 of the 1990 policy is the first outline level in the 
section, even though it is not preceded by “D” or “IV.” Second, when the policy broke down 
sections beyond the third outline level, those subdivisions were each treated as separate 
terms if, and only if, the aggregate number of lines in that section (including the umbrella 
terms) of the policy was ten or more. Third, an “umbrella section” that was either before or 
after subdivided text was itself treated as a separate term if it contained 10 or more words. 
Otherwise, this umbrella language was treated as part of the same term as the nearest outline 
provision to which it applied. 
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After subdividing the policies into individual “terms,” I130 then 
assessed how each of these terms changed coverage relative to the 
corresponding term in the previous version of the HO3 policy.131  
I coded each term in each of the five ISO revisions to the HO3 policy 
using the following scheme132: 
 
Code Description 
0 No change in policy language. 
1 Change to punctuation, formatting, or location of policy 
text or to wording choice that does not plausibly alter 
text’s meaning. 
2 Change that may alter policy’s meaning and that restricts 
the scope of coverage in all relevant claims settings.133 
3 Change that may alter policy’s meaning by expanding 
the scope of coverage in some relevant claims settings 
and restricting it in others. 
4 Change that may alter policy’s meaning by expanding 
the scope of coverage in all relevant claims settings. 
5 Change that only alters the amount of coverage provided 
by changing numerical quantities, such as increasing 
coverage for certain property from $500 to $1000. 
  
 
 130. I performed all of the defining of terms and coding of changes to these terms 
myself. However, I occasionally had a trained research assistant do the first draft, which I 
then carefully double-checked. 
 131. For new provisions, this inquiry required assessment of how the new term 
impacted coverage relative to the absence of the term. In a small number of cases, a policy 
revision completely removed a preexisting term. Where this happened, an additional 
“shadow term” was added to the later policy to indicate the removal of that term. 
 132. In performing this coding, I adhered to three supplemental principles. First, global 
changes to a policy (such as the hyphenation of a term) were treated as a single change, coded 
in the first term in which they appear but not thereafter treated as an independent change. 
Second, changes to cross references (either numerical or text reproduced verbatim from a 
prior section) were not treated as a change apart from the term that triggered the need for 
the changed cross reference. Third, for new coverages that clearly did not exist in prior policy 
versions, restrictions on the scope of the new coverage were still treated as expansions 
of coverage. 
 133. Evaluating the impact of any particular change on the generosity of coverage can 
be complicated when a term interacts with other terms, as is common with definitions, for 
instance. In these cases, the impact of a particular change is evaluated against the baseline of 
the coverage that the updated policy would have provided had the term in question not 
been altered. 
3.SCHWARCZ_FIN.NH (DO NOT DELETE)  3/11/2021  12:58 AM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 46:2 (2021) 
496 
 
2. Phase Two: Linking innovation in the ISO HO3 policy to  
published caselaw 
Phase Two of the analysis focused on linking changes in the ISO 
HO3 policy found in Phase One to any caselaw that may plausibly 
have prompted those changes. To accomplish this, I relied on a 
team of trained research assistants, acting under my supervision 
and review, to implement the following protocol.  
First, we isolated each individual policy term (as defined above) 
that had been coded as a 2,134 3,135 or 4136 in Phase One, as only these 
terms had been materially altered from the prior version of the 
policy in a way that could plausibly have been influenced by 
caselaw.137 For each of these material alterations, we then located 
all published and unpublished cases available on Westlaw during 
the relevant timeframe (as defined below) that quoted a portion of 
the term as it was drafted prior to the revision. To ensure that we 
captured the vast majority of such cases, we searched for cases that 
contained, within a single sentence, five key words (excluding 
articles) drawn from the policy term that had been revised.138  
We are confident that this method generally captured the vast 
majority of cases implicating policy language that was revised in 
subsequent policies, as any such cases are virtually certain to quote 
the relevant policy language before applying it to a particular 
coverage dispute. 
Because we were only interested in cases that may have been 
causally connected to the changed terms, we restricted the search 
to cases released within two years after the date of the updated 
 
 134. Change that may alter policy’s meaning and that restricts the scope of coverage in 
all relevant claims settings. 
 135. Change that may alter policy’s meaning by expanding the scope of coverage in 
some relevant claims settings and restricting it in others. 
 136. Change that may alter policy’s meaning by expanding the scope of coverage in all 
relevant claims settings. 
 137. Although terms coded as 5—meaning that there was a change that only altered 
the amount of coverage provided by changing numerical quantities—did indeed constitute 
material changes, we reasoned that such changes could not have plausibly been related 
to caselaw. 
 138. This approach did not work in the rare instances when entirely new provisions 
were added to an updated policy; in these instances, we used a reduced number of key terms 
from the new term to attempt to locate caselaw that might have triggered the addition. 
Additionally, in a few instances, an individual term included more than one sentence.  
In such cases we adjusted the search accordingly to span two sentences. 
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policy and two years prior to the publication of the revised policy. 
For instance, for a material change implemented in the 2010 HO3 
policy, we searched for caselaw quoting the 1999 version of the 
changed term, but only if this caselaw was made publicly available 
between 1997 and 2012. We decided to start two years before the 
publication of the unrevised policy to reflect the fact that cases 
released shortly before publication of a finalized policy revision 
may influence the subsequent policy revision. Meanwhile, we 
extended the search two years past publication of the policy with 
revised language to reflect the fact that some litigation may prompt 
contractual change before it results in a publicly available opinion 
if, for instance, preliminary court decisions foreshadowed the 
ultimate result. 
After locating these cases, we then made several adjustments to 
avoid false positives and potential double counts. In particular, we 
eliminated any cases where the opinion suggested that the parties 
did not contest the meaning of the changed term.139 We reasoned 
that such cases had no potential bearing on the subsequent change 
in policy language.140 To avoid double counting individual cases, 
we also eliminated any intermediate or trial court cases where a 
higher court had released a decision that was also linked to the 
changed term.141  
Having eliminated the false positives and problematic double 
counts, we then recorded a variety of the remaining cases’ features. 
In addition to tracking the aggregate number of cases we found that 
met the above criteria—with a self-imposed limit of ten cases per 
term142—we recorded the type of court that issued the opinion and 
 
 139. We included cases that involved contestation of the exact same insurance language 
in the context of a non-homeowners policy, so long as the language was not further specified 
or defined in the policy at issue in the case in a way that differed from its treatment in the 
homeowners policy. 
 140. For instance, in some cases, courts quoted policy language in the facts section of 
the opinion, but this policy language had nothing to do with the legal issue that the court 
addressed in the opinion. 
 141. However, we did record when individual cases were linked to multiple different 
changes in terms using our protocol, and we also counted such cases towards the limit of ten 
cases for each of those terms. 
 142. The number of terms that had more than ten cases linked to them varied. For the 
terms that were materially changed, the number of terms that were capped at ten case links 
were as follows: in 1975 there were 9 capped terms, in 1984 there were 14 capped terms, in 
1990 there were 6 capped terms, in 1999 there were 40 capped terms, and in 2010 there were 
12 capped terms. There were many fewer capped terms in the control data of terms that were 
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whether the insurer, policyholder, or neither party prevailed with 
respect to their preferred meaning of the policy language. We 
imposed the cap of ten cases for practical reasons, as several terms 
resulted in hundreds of cases that could not all be reviewed. In 
instances where this cap was hit, we examined cases in the order of 
how recently they were published within the relevant time frame. 
As a control measure, we applied this same methodology to 
policy terms that ISO left unchanged in each policy revision. This 
allowed us to isolate the increased (or decreased) amount of 
caselaw for changed terms relative to unchanged terms. To 
implement this approach, we isolated from each policy revision 
fifty random terms that had not been materially altered from the 
prior policy iteration.143 We then repeated the process described 
above for each of these terms; we searched for all cases released 
between the revision dates of the two comparison policies (with the 
two-year buffers added) that contained, within a single sentence, 
five key words drawn from the term. We then eliminated all cases 
in which the parties did not contest the meaning of the term.  
3. Caveats and limitations of methodology 
This methodology, of course, has important limitations. First, 
the approach only yields evidence of correlation rather than 
causation. It is possible that, in some cases, there is no causal link 
between heightened amounts of caselaw regarding a term’s 
meaning and ISO’s subsequent decision to materially alter that 
term. For instance, it may be that the very reason that a term was 
relatively heavily litigated was because it was flawed in ways that 
would inevitably have prompted contractual change.144 But while 
 
not materially changed. Here, the number of capped cases were as follows: in 1975 there 
were no capped terms, in 1984 there were 4 capped terms, in 1990 there were 6 capped terms, 
in 1999 there were 3 capped terms, and in 2010 there were 5 capped terms. 
 143. We also excluded from the control group terms that were part of global changes 
to the policy but were coded as zeroes because they appeared after the first term in which 
the global term appeared. 
 144. Another possible non-causal explanation for any correlation between cases and 
policy revisions is that terms that are litigated are relatively likely to have significant 
implications for coverage, a consideration which also impacts the likelihood of policy 
revision. Although plausible, this explanation also seems unlikely to substantially explain 
the results. The primary difficulty with this theory is that the importance of a policy term 
does not, in itself, seem to have a substantial impact on the frequency of policy revisions.  
It is in precisely the case of particularly important terms that the costs of redrafting—
including securing regulatory approval and increasing the risk of unintended 
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it is impossible to reject this possibility for every materially changed 
term, it is highly unlikely that this can systematically explain the 
results. To the extent that a term was inherently problematic in a 
way that would inevitably have prompted change, one would have 
expected this change to have been made relatively early in the 
evolution of the HO3 policy.  
A second important limitation of the methodology is that it 
does not seek to evaluate how often published caselaw fails to 
prompt changes in policy language. As noted earlier, several 
scholars have emphasized various instances when cases that 
produce seemingly unfavorable results for insurers fail to prompt 
relatively straightforward fixes.145 Thus, while the results can 
demonstrate whether courts have played a significant role in the 
evolution of insurance policy language, they cannot demonstrate 
that this effect is inevitable or consistent with respect to individual 
terms; to the contrary, the various instances of relatively limited 
policy language change in the face of relevant and significant 
amounts of caselaw suggest quite the opposite.146  
A third limitation of the methodology is that it does not attempt 
to evaluate the relative importance of different types of policy 
changes. Thus, it groups together all changes that expand coverage 
and all changes that restrict coverage, even though some of these 
changes are obviously more consequential than others. For this 
reason, comparing the number of coverage expansions to coverage 
restrictions may not fully capture the ultimate impact of those 
changes on the generosity of coverage.  
Finally, an important caveat to this Article’s methodology is 
that, as discussed earlier, some insurers are increasingly departing 
in significant ways from the ISO HO3 policy.147 Consequently, the 
results track the evolution of actual homeowners policies that are 
 
consequences—may be greatest. Nor is it obvious that litigated cases disproportionately 
involve broadly consequential terms. A policy term may be consequential enough in a single 
case to warrant the costs of litigation, even though it comes up relatively infrequently. 
Moreover, coverage disputes involving relatively important policy terms may be 
disproportionally likely to settle before any case is published, as insurers may fear that a 
negative precedent can have broad implications. 
 145. See Boardman, Contra Proferentem, supra note 20, at 1113–14, 1117; French, 
Insurance Policies, supra note 20, at 40. 
 146. See Boardman, Contra Proferentem, supra note 20, at 1113–14, 1117; French, 
Insurance Policies, supra note 20, at 40. 
 147. See Schwarcz, Reevaluating, supra note 7. 
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employed across the country only among a (still quite large) subset 
of insurers. As discussed in Part IV, this caveat has important 
normative implications, as it suggests that lawmakers, courts, and 
regulators should strongly consider promoting greater 
standardization of insurance policies by requiring insurers  
to use homeowners policies that are no less generous than the  
ISO HO3 form.148  
III. RESULTS: EVIDENCE OF COURTS’ SUBSTANTIAL ROLE IN 
PROMPTING INNOVATION OF HOMEOWNERS INSURANCE POLICIES 
The dominant homeowners insurance policy in the United 
States has evolved substantially over its fifty-year lifetime as the 
ISO HO3 policy. These changes have undoubtedly made the policy 
longer and more complex. But they have had a more mixed impact 
on the scope of coverage provided to homeowners: sometimes 
expanding coverage, sometimes restricting it, and often adopting 
intermediate positions that potentially have both coverage-
expanding and coverage-restricting features. Section A of this Part 
reviews these results from Phase One of the study. Section B then 
presents the results of Phase Two, providing evidence that judicial 
caselaw has played a substantial role in guiding the evolution of 
the modern homeowners policy. This role, moreover, seems to have 
increased over time as the HO3 policy has matured. Notably, 
caselaw appears to have played a much stronger role in prompting 
changes that either restrict coverage or else that had mixed impacts 
on the scope of coverage; by contrast, changes that unambiguously 
expanded coverage were no more likely to have been linked to 
caselaw than unchanged terms. 
A. The Evolution of the ISO HO3 Policy over Time 
The length and complexity of the ISO HO3 homeowners policy 
has increased over time, but at a gradually decreasing rate. This is 
well illustrated by Figure 1, which shows that the total number of 
terms in each version of the policy continually increased until  
1999 but leveled off in the 2010 revision. These trends are also 
reflected in the total number of pages in each policy revision,  
 
 148. See infra Section IV.A. 
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which increased from 8 pages (1971), to 12 pages (1975), to 15 pages 
(1984), to 18 pages (1990), to 22 pages (1999), to 24 pages (2010). 
 
Figure 1: HO3 Term Changes over Time 
The decreased rate of change in the homeowners policy is 
evident not only by the aggregate number of terms in each policy 
revision but also by the percentage of terms that were materially 
altered in each revision. Material alterations encompass all changes 
that received Codes 2, 3, 4, or 5 in each revision. Figure 2 charts the 
percentage of such terms, as compared to the percentage of terms 
that were either immaterially altered (received a Code 1) or left 
unchanged (Code 0) in each revision. As it illustrates, the 
percentage of terms that were materially altered has generally 
decreased over time, albeit with a blip in the data for the 1999 
revision. But even the 1999 revision had a smaller percentage of 
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Figure 2: Percentage of Policy Terms Materially Altered 
Focusing just on non-quantitative material alterations to policy 
language—a category that encompasses changes coded as 2, 3, or 4, 
and which is referred to below as “modified terms”—these changes 
were slightly more likely to restrict coverage than to expand 
coverage.149 As Figure 3 illustrates, the percentage of modified 
terms that unambiguously restricted coverage ranged from 32% to 
63% of total modified terms for each policy revision year. But in 
each revision, a meaningful percentage of modified terms—
between 17% and 35%—unambiguously increased the scope of 
coverage, and a substantial percentage—between 43% and 20%—




 149. Changes that only altered the amount of coverage provided by changing 
numerical quantities, and thus received a code of 5, consistently expanded coverage, 
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Figure 3: Impact of Modified Terms on Scope of Coverage 
Although modified terms were only moderately more likely to 
restrict coverage than to expand it, the percentage of changes that 
restricted coverage relative to other types of material textual 
changes has increased over time. Indeed, as illustrated by Figure 4, 
the ratio of coverage-expanding changes to coverage-restricting 
changes has decreased in every revision. Another illustration of this 
point is that the total number of modified terms that 
unambiguously restricted coverage (Code 2) oscillated between 30 
and 100, while the number of changes that unambiguously 
expanded coverage (Code 4) declined from around 50 in the 1975 































ISO HO3 Policy Revision Year
Coverage Expanding Changes % (Code 4)
Ambiguous Changes % (Code 3)
Coverage Restricting Changes % (Code 2)
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Figure 4: Ratio of Coverage-Expanding Modifications to            
Coverage-Restricting Modifications 
B. The Role of Caselaw in Prompting Changes to the Homeowners Policy 
The ISO HO3 policy has clearly changed significantly over time. 
This Section assesses the role of courts in this evolution. To do so, 
it attempts to link modified terms containing material, textual 
alterations—coded as 2s, 3s, or 4s in Phase One—to published 
caselaw. The total number of such modified terms for each policy 
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Figure 5: Total Number of Modified Terms 
 The data suggest that judicial caselaw has played a major role 
in prompting material textual changes to the ISO homeowners 
policy. The best way to see this is in Figure 6, which reports both 
the average number of cases linked to modified terms and the 
average number of cases linked to unchanged policy terms (i.e., 
terms that were coded 0). Recall that a case was linked to a term if 
(i) it quoted portions of the term’s policy language, (ii) in the time 
period between when the term was changed and the last policy 
revision, and (iii) individualized analysis concluded that the parties 
contested the meaning of the quoted policy language.150 As Figure 
6 shows, the average number of cases linked to modified terms 
varied from roughly 1.8 to 4.5 depending on the policy year. By 
contrast, the average number of cases linked to unchanged terms 
ranged from .93 to 1.88 depending on the year. Collapsing all five 
revisions of the HO3 policy, terms with materially altered text were 
linked with approximately twice as many cases relative to 
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unchanged terms.151 These differences between the number of case 
links for modified and unchanged terms are statistically significant.  
Figure 6: Average Number of Cases Linked to Modified Terms Relative to 
Unchanged Terms 
Indeed, for each revision year other than 1975, the difference 
between the average number of case links for modified and 
unchanged terms is statistically significant at a 98% confidence 
level.152 When considered across all five policy revisions, the 
statistical significance of the gap between these two categories is 
well over 99%.153  
 
 151. Because we capped at ten the number of case links for each textual change, these 
figures cannot be explained by a very large number of cases associated with a small number 
of alterations. 
 152. These calculations were performed using a simple T test for samples with  
unequal variances. 
 153. Moreover, the results understate the average number of case links for changed 
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The importance of caselaw in prompting contractual innovation 
is reinforced by Figure 7, which reports the total percentage of 
modified and unchanged terms that were linked to at least one case. 
Figure 7: Percentage of Modified Terms and Unchanged Terms Linked to at 
Least One Case 
As Figure 7 reports, in every revision year, modified terms were 
more likely than unchanged terms to be linked to at least one case. 
 
Although the number of terms that had more than ten cases linked to them varied, this cap 
disproportionately impacted changed terms relative to the unchanged control terms. For the 
terms that were materially changed, the number of terms that were capped at ten case links 
were as follows: in 1975 there were 9 capped terms out of approximately 160 materially 
altered terms; in 1984 there were 14 capped terms out of approximately 160 materially altered 
terms; in 1990 there were 6 capped terms out of approximately 90 materially altered terms; 
in 1999 there were 40 capped terms out of approximately 180 materially altered terms; and 
in 2010 there were 12 capped terms out of approximately 80 materially altered terms. In total, 
then, approximately 12% of changed terms were capped. For terms that were not materially 
changed, the number of capped cases (out of 50 total control terms for each revision) were as 
follows: in 1975 there were no capped terms, in 1984 there were 4 capped terms, in 1990 there 
were 6 capped terms, in 1999 there were 3 capped terms, and in 2010 there were 5 capped 
































ISO HO3 Policy Revision Year
Modified Terms Unchanged Terms
3.SCHWARCZ_FIN.NH (DO NOT DELETE)  3/11/2021  12:58 AM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 46:2 (2021) 
508 
 
Overall, 58% of modified terms were linked to at least one case, 
whereas 43% of unchanged terms were linked to at least one case.  
Figure 8: Difference in Average Number of Cases Linked to Modified and 
Unchanged Terms 
The data also suggest a second trend: caselaw seems to have 
played an increasingly important role in prompting material 
textual changes to the ISO homeowners policy. As illustrated in 
Figure 8, the average number of cases linked to a modified term 
relative to the average number of such case links for unchanged 
terms has steadily increased with each HO3 update, with the slight 
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Figure 9: Difference in Percentage of Modified Terms and Unchanged Terms Linked 
to at Least One Case 
Similarly, Figure 9 shows that—with the notable exception of 1999, 
when a high percentage of unchanged terms were linked to at least 
one case—the difference between the percentage of modified terms 
and unchanged terms linked to caselaw has increased in each 
revision year. Of course, these trends are much more speculative 
than those above, given that the number of data points for changes 
over time is limited to the five times that the ISO HO3 policy has 
been revised. 
 Interestingly, caselaw seems to have played a much more 
prominent role in prompting modified terms that restrict or have a 
mixed impact on coverage than in prompting changes that expand 
coverage. This conclusion is reflected in Figure 10, which breaks 
down the average number of cases linked to three different types 
of modified terms: (i) those that unambiguously restrict coverage 
(Code 2), (ii) those that have ambiguous or mixed implications with 
respect to the scope of coverage (Code 3), and (iii) those that 
unambiguously expand coverage (Code 4). The Figure also reports 
the average number of cases linked to terms that were left 
unchanged (Code 0). As the data in Figure 10 suggest, modified 
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case links, followed closely by modified terms that had an 
ambiguous impact on the scope of coverage. By contrast, changes 
that expanded coverage in the ISO HO3 policy were linked on 
average to a much lower number of cases, which was only slightly 
larger than the average number of case links for the control group 
of terms that were unchanged. 
Figure 10: Average Number of Case Links per Modified Terms 
and Unchanged Terms 
The comparatively weak link between caselaw and coverage-
expanding modifications is also illustrated by Figure 11. This 
Figure shows that a majority (51%) of the coverage-expanding 
modifications were not linked with any cases, as was also true for 
the unchanged policy terms (57%). By contrast, only about 40% of 
coverage-restricting (Code 2) and ambiguous (Code 3) 
modifications were not linked to any cases. Similarly, a much 
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linked to ten or more cases (3%) than was true for ambiguous (13%) 
or coverage-restricting (20%) modifications.154 
Figure 11: Number of Case Law Links for Modified Terms and Unchanged Terms 
Not surprisingly, much of the caselaw that was linked to both 
material textual modifications and unchanged terms came from 
state appellate courts.155 As illustrated in Figure 12, 53% of the cases 
linked to modified terms came from state intermediate appellate 
courts, 24% of these cases came from state supreme courts, and 21% 
came from federal courts. These breakdowns are very similar to the 
breakdown of cases that were linked to unchanged terms—52% of 
which came from state intermediate courts, 15% of which came 
 
 154. In fact, a smaller percentage of coverage-expanding textual revisions were linked 
to ten or more cases than the percentage of control terms that is this cap (7%). 
 155. The relative composition of different types of court decisions does not appear to 
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from state supreme courts, and 24% of which came from federal 
courts. These data suggest that the type of court issuing a relevant 
opinion does not, in and of itself, substantially influence the 
likelihood that a judicial opinion will prompt contractual change. 
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Another notable finding is that policyholders need not 
consistently prevail in coverage disputes for those disputes to be 
linked to changed policy language. To the contrary, as reported in 
Figure 13, insurers prevailed in almost half of all the cases linked to 
modified terms, a win percentage that was only slightly lower than 
the baseline win percentage in cases that were linked to unchanged 
policy terms. 
Figure 13: Prevailing Parties in Cases Linked to Terms 
The relevance of the mere fact that a term produces litigation, 
as opposed to who ultimately wins the case, is also suggested by 
Figure 14. That Figure shows that the type of changes that insurers 
make to their policy forms are not generally impacted by whether 
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Figure 14: Overall Case Link Breakdown by Outcome 
Although policyholders need not consistently prevail to 
prompt material textual changes in policy language, it does appear 
that it makes a difference with respect to the likelihood of redrafting 
if policyholders consistently lose coverage disputes. This point is 
reflected in Figure 15, which reports that approximately 44% of 
policy modifications were linked to caselaw that included at least 
one clear policyholder victory. By contrast, only 21% of the 
unchanged policy terms were linked to caselaw that included a 
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Figure 15: Modified and Unchanged Terms Linked to at Least One Case Where 
Policyholder Prevailed 
IV. IMPLICATIONS FOR INSURANCE AND CONTRACT LAW 
Part III suggests that courts have played a major role in shaping 
the modern homeowners insurance policy. This Part considers the 
implications of this fact, both for insurance law specifically and for 
contract law more generally. With respect to the former, it argues 
that judicially prompted innovation of the ISO HO3 form has 
promoted more efficient and fair insurance markets, at least for the 
majority of insurers that continue to rely on policies that closely 
track the ISO form. For this reason, courts should continue to 
embrace penalty default rules, like contra proferentem, that 
maximize insurers’ incentives to redraft unclear or ambiguous 
policy language. Section A of this Part also reviews prior research 
demonstrating that penalty default rules in insurance law have 









































ISO HO3 Policy Revision Year
Modified Terms Unchanged Terms
3.SCHWARCZ_FIN.NH (DO NOT DELETE)  3/11/2021  12:58 AM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 46:2 (2021) 
516 
 
substantially depart from the ISO model. The Section argues that, 
taken together, these findings suggest that states should consider 
requiring homeowners insurers to use policies that are at least as 
generous as the ISO HO3 policy. 
Section B broadens the analysis to consider the implications of 
the Article’s findings for the empirical literature on contract 
innovation. Against the backdrop of this literature, the Article’s 
results suggest that different types of contracts can evolve quite 
differently: whereas sophisticated financial contracts like sovereign 
bond covenants may be sticky and change through herding, 
consumer-oriented form contracts may be more likely to evolve 
steadily in response to judicial pressures. But even within broad 
categories like consumer and business-oriented contracts, market 
and institutional structures have a significant impact on the pace 
and nature of contractual innovation generally and judicially 
prompted innovation in particular.  
A. Insurance Law 
1. Insurance law’s penalty default rules and the ISO HO3 policy 
Insurance policies are often described as contracts of adhesion 
that are drafted by insurers and offered to consumers on a take-it-
or-leave-it basis.156 But as Part III demonstrates, courts have played 
a major role in the evolution of the ISO HO3 policy due to their 
embrace of penalty default rules like contra proferentem.157 This role 
has ultimately served the collective interests of both insurers and 
consumers, for two essential reasons.  
First, the data clearly demonstrate that, over its fifty-year 
evolution, the ISO HO3 policy has become longer, more precise, 
and more fully specified as a result of judicial scrutiny.158 Not 
surprisingly, ambiguous, non-specific, and confusing policy 
language can frequently prompt coverage disputes: insurers have 
natural incentives to interpret unclear language so as to limit 
coverage, whereas policyholders have precisely the opposite 
 
 156. See, e.g., Friedrich Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion—Some Thoughts About Freedom  
of Contract, 43 COLUM. L. REV. 629 (1943); Randall, supra note 62, at 125; Fischer,  
supra note 62, at 996. 
 157. See supra Section III.B. 
 158. See supra Section III.A. 
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incentives.159 Such coverage disputes are costly for all involved: 
aside from the obvious legal costs that these clashes produce, they 
also leave insureds who have recently suffered a loss in a state of 
prolonged uncertainty and stress.160 Additionally, the legal costs 
that insurers incur in these disputes are likely passed on to their 
policyholders at least partially in the form of increased premiums. 
Precise and specific homeowners policies help to limit the 
likelihood of these costly and taxing coverage disputes. Perhaps 
most obviously, clear and specific policy language allows insurance 
adjustors and claims supervisors to more reliably and quickly 
determine their insurer’s coverage obligations.161 Just as 
importantly, however, such clarity empowers consumers—often 
with the help of family, friends, or advisors—to decipher their 
coverage rights relatively clearly after a loss has occurred.162 This is 
because state law generally requires insurers that deny a claim or 
issue a reservation of rights letter to promptly provide a written 
explanation for their decision that quotes the relevant policy 
language.163 Whereas policyholders rarely read policy language 
closely when they first purchase coverage,164 they can and often do 
 
 159. See JAY M. FEINMAN, DELAY, DENY, DEFEND: WHY INSURANCE COMPANIES DON’T 
PAY CLAIMS AND WHAT YOU CAN DO ABOUT IT (2010). 
 160. See Daniel Schwarcz, Redesigning Consumer Dispute Resolution: A Case Study of the 
British and American Approaches to Insurance Claims Conflict, 83 TUL. L. REV. 735 (2009). 
 161. Insurers rarely deny coverage when clear and precise policy language requires the 
provision of such coverage, as doing so exposes them to the threat of punitive damages for 
a bad faith denial of a claim. See Mark J. Browne, Ellen S. Pryor & Bob Puelz, The Effect of  
Bad‐Faith Laws on First‐Party Insurance Claims Decisions, 33 J. LEGAL STUD. 355 (2004);  
Danial P. Asmat & Sharon Tennyson, Does the Threat of Insurer Liability for “Bad Faith” Affect 
Insurance Settlements?, 81 J. RISK & INS. 1 (2014). 
 162. See Schwarcz, Coverage Information, supra note 30, at 1494–98; Boardman, Tested 
Language Defense, supra note 62. 
 163. See Schwarcz, Coverage Information, supra note 30, at 1496; see, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. 
§ 23-66-206(13) (2020); COLO. REV. STAT. § 10-3-1104 (2015); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 626.9541 (2019). 
 164. To be sure, the increasing length and complexity of the ISO HO3 policy has made 
it even more difficult for consumers to fully read and understand that policy at the time of 
purchase. But consumers do not read and/or understand even relatively short standard form 
contracts. See Yannis Bakos, Florencia Marotta-Wurgler & David R. Trossen, Does Anyone 
Read the Fine Print? Consumer Attention to Standard-Form Contracts, 43 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 4 
(2014). The increasing length and complexity of the HO3 policy is thus unlikely to change 
this result for the vast majority of consumers. For those consumers who do wish to have a 
better sense of what their policy covers at the time of purchase, the solution is not a 
misguided attempt for a more “readable” and “simplified” insurance policy, but the design 
of a standardized summary disclosure form that contains the key details consumers care 
about. See Daniel Schwarcz, Transparently Opaque: Understanding the Lack of Transparency in 
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read this language closely when trying to understand whether they 
have been rightly denied insurance proceeds.165  
To be sure, precision and specificity in homeowners policies 
would do little to advance consumer interests if they only operated 
to restrict coverage. But the second reason that judicial scrutiny has 
improved insurance markets is that it has prompted revisions to the 
ISO HO3 policy that reasonably balance consumers’ desire for 
protection against insurers’ legitimate need to minimize dangers 
like moral hazard and adverse selection.166 Rather than inexorably 
narrowing coverage, the data show that judicially promoted 
revisions to the ISO HO3 policy have resulted in terms that have a 
mixed impact on coverage almost as often as they have produced 
terms that unambiguously restrict coverage.167 The data also show 
that unambiguous expansions of coverage are relatively common, 
though these changes appear not to be driven by caselaw.168  
The lack of a clear link between unambiguous coverage 
expansions and court cases is consistent with the conclusion that 
judicial scrutiny of the ISO HO3 policy has prompted reasonable 
and even-handed coverage revisions. This is because coverage 
expansions in response to judicial decisions typically manifest 
themselves not as changes in policy language, but instead as the 
retention of policy language, notwithstanding caselaw finding that 
language is ambiguous. Insurance law’s penalty default rules are 
specifically designed to expand coverage when the policy itself is 
ambiguous or contains gaps.169 Meanwhile, as noted above, 
affirmatively redrafting ISO policy terms to produce this result is 
both costly and risky.170 For these reasons, it is easier for insurers to 
 
Insurance Consumer Protection, 61 UCLA L. REV. 394, 420–25 (2014) [hereinafter Schwarcz, 
Transparently Opaque]. 
 165. See generally Hoffman, supra note 58, at 1412 (“Most argue, in one form or another, 
that even if terms don’t affect behavior ex ante, they certainly can ex post.”). 
 166. See supra Section III.A. 
 167. See id. 
 168. See supra Section III.B. This is especially true early in the ISO HO3 policy’s 
evolution. Later in the policy’s evolution, coverage restrictions start to outpace coverage 
expansions. But this is consistent with the fact that, as the contract has matured, an 
increasingly large percentage of revisions are prompted by court cases. This trend, in turn, 
can best be explained by the fact that decades of revisions have left little need for contract 
revisions in the absence of changed circumstances, like relevant court cases. 
 169. See ABRAHAM & SCHWARCZ, supra note 6, at 58–59. See generally Ayres & Gertner, 
supra note 29, at 90. 
 170. See supra Section II.A.2. 
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expand coverage in response to judicial scrutiny simply by 
retaining language that courts have repeatedly found 
ambiguous,171 rather than by explicitly altering the ISO form.172  
The tendency of changes to the ISO HO3 policy to both increase 
precision and reasonably balance consumer and insurer interests is 
not surprising. There are good reasons to believe that detailed and 
precise terms in the ISO HO3 policy facilitate the ability of 
consumer proxies, like state regulators and market 
intermediaries—such as agents, brokers, journalists, consumer 
activists, and academics—to understand exactly what is and is not 
covered by the homeowners policy and to advance consumer 
interests accordingly. For instance, a clear term limiting coverage 
for mold-related claims may prompt a regulator to withhold 
approval of the policy form unless coverage is extended for specific 
mold losses that are unlikely to involve moral hazard.173 
Alternatively, such an exclusion may prompt insurance agents to 
object that this type of change will make it harder to sell coverage. 
These possibilities, of course, impact how ISO drafts coverage 
restrictions in the first place.  
By contrast, it is much harder for regulators or market 
intermediaries to advocate for more coverage-expansive terms in 
policies containing extensive gaps or ambiguities. Not only is there 
the problem of “spotting” the existence of an important gap or 
ambiguity in the first place, but it’s also hard to anticipate the 
various ways in which such gaps and ambiguities may become 
relevant in different claims settings.174 And even in the rare cases 
when regulators and intermediaries identify potential ambiguities 
or gaps, they often cannot predict how insurers will respond when 
a claim is actually made.175 By forcing these issues to be addressed 
 
 171. See Boardman, Contra Proferentem, supra note 20, at 1113–14, 1117; French, 
Insurance Policies, supra note 20, at 40; ABRAHAM & SCHWARCZ, supra note 6, at 615 (noting 
that courts have “created a body of common law rules” governing the duty to defend, and 
“[a]pparently insurers can live with the results, as they have not revised their policies  
to alter” them). 
 172. Of course, such redrafting would be optimal because it would enhance the form’s 
precision and specificity, as described above. 
 173. See Schwarcz, Coverage Information, supra note 30, at 1492–94. State insurance 
regulators in most states can refuse to approve homeowners policy forms. See id. 
 174. See generally Schwarcz, Coverage Information, supra note 30, at 1474. 
 175. For example, in attempting to justify the inclusion of an “absolute pollution 
exclusion” in commercial general liability policies, the industry claimed that “the language 
of the exclusion was drafted with unrealistic breadth to ensure its effectiveness,” but “it 
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clearly within the four corners of the industry standard policy, 
judicially prompted innovation thus effectively “activates” the 
ability of market intermediaries and regulators to represent 
consumer interests. It is for precisely this reason that judicially 
prompted changes to the ISO HO3 policy often result in revisions 
that have a mixed impact on the scope of coverage.176 
In sum, insurance law’s embrace of penalty default rules 
generally, and contra proferentem in particular, appears to have 
played a major role in causing the ISO homeowners insurance 
policy to become clearer and more precise.177 This contractual 
innovation, in turn, has facilitated compromise regarding the scope 
of coverage provided by that policy while empowering consumers 
and their advisers to accurately and quickly understand their 
coverage rights after a loss has occurred. For these reasons, 
insurance law should continue to embrace strong penalty 
default rules.178   
2. Penalty default rules and non-ISO homeowners policies 
Although the evolution of the ISO HO3 policy has largely 
served consumer and insurer interests alike, the same cannot be 
said for the recent emergence of proprietary homeowners policies 
that depart significantly from ISO forms.179 To be sure, like the ISO 
HO3 policy, these proprietary forms often have the benefits of 
precision and completeness described above.180 But as I have 
 
would not be literally enforced against insured[s] in cases where doing so would be 
inconsistent with basic understanding about the policy.” Jeffrey W. Stempel, Unmet 
Expectations: Undue Restriction of the Reasonable Expectations Approach and the Misleading 
Mythology of Judicial Role, 5 CONN. INS. L.J. 181, 235–36 (1998). 
 176. See supra Section III.B. 
 177. Although policyholders need not consistently prevail for caselaw to prompt 
changed policy language, they must have a significant chance of winning for this result to 
obtain. See supra Section III.B. Indeed, policy revisions were much more likely than control 
terms to be linked to at least one clear policyholder victory. See id. Additionally, cases with 
plausible arguments are much more likely to prompt published caselaw, as opposed to 
summary dismissals in unpublished opinions. See, e.g., Bert I. Huang & Tejas N. Narechania, 
Judicial Priorities, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 1719 (2015). 
 178. But see Rappaport, supra note 98, at 207–08 (arguing that contra proferentem does 
not ultimately promote effective and efficient insurance markets). 
 179. See generally Schwarcz, Reevaluating, supra note 7 (exploring in depth the 
prevalence and characteristics of homeowners policies that depart significantly from the  
ISO HO3 policy). 
 180. See id. 
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explored at length in prior work, these policies typically do not 
embrace compromise positions when it comes to changes in 
coverage; to the contrary, they often systematically restrict 
coverage relative to the ISO HO3 form.181  
The reason for this different result is that, unlike changes to the 
ISO policy, innovation in proprietary forms is not well policed by 
regulators and market actors. Because of ISO’s historically 
dominant role in drafting homeowners insurance policies, an 
immense amount of attention is devoted to revisions of these forms. 
For instance, numerous trade publications for brokers, agents, 
lawyers, and underwriters publish articles about revisions to major 
ISO programs, like the homeowners program.182 Copies of these 
updated ISO forms are published in materials that are used to train 
aspiring insurance lawyers, agents, and underwriters.183 Perhaps 
even more importantly, state regulators often spend a great deal of 
time reviewing proposed revisions to the ISO HO3 policy.184 This is 
because ISO itself, in order to facilitate insurer use of these 
documents, secures regulatory approval of its policy forms in every 
state in the country that requires such approval.185 Knowing that 
these filings have disproportionate influence on consumers, state 
regulators often review these filings carefully and demand various 
concessions, which are reflected in state-specific endorsements.186 
This regulatory review process is presumably aided by state 
insurance regulators’ relative familiarity with prior versions of ISO 
 
 181. See id. 
 182. See, e.g., Miller, supra note 112; Patrick Wraight, How Does the Homeowners’ Policy 
Deal with Trees?, INS. J.: ACAD. J. (Oct. 11, 2017), https://www.insurancejournal.com/blogs/ 
academy-journal/2017/10/11/466847.htm; Patrick Wraight, 4 Reasons Your Insured  
Wants Ordinance or Law Coverage, INS. J.: ACAD. J. (Jan. 3, 2018), https:// 
www.insurancejournal.com/blogs/academy-journal/2018/01/03/475878.htm. 
 183. See, e.g., ABRAHAM & SCHWARCZ, supra note 6, at 197–223; TOM BAKER & KYLE D. 
LOGUE, INSURANCE LAW AND POLICY (4th ed. 2017); INS. INFO. INST., supra note 127; 
MCCORMICK & CLAPP, JR., supra note 80. 
 184. See New ISO Residential Property Policy Forms Approved, TEX. DEP’T INS.  
(Sept. 6, 2014), https://www.tdi.texas.gov/orders/co020741.html; VERISK, Homeowners 
2000, supra note 89. 
 185. See, e.g., ISO Files Insurance Policy Forms and Rules Insurers Can Use for  
Terror Coverage Under New Federal Backstop Law, VERISK (Dec. 4, 2002), 
https://www.verisk.com/archived/2002/iso-files-insurance-policy-forms-and-rules-
insurers-can-use-for-terror-coverage-under-new-federal-ba/. 
 186. See, e.g., New ISO Residential Property Policy Forms Approved, supra note 184 
(describing rigorous regulatory review of ISO HO3 policy form submissions, including 
numerous concessions made by ISO to secure regulatory approval for use of form in Texas). 
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homeowners forms, which allows them to quickly grasp a 
revision’s structure and the potential implications of its 
proposed changes. 
By contrast, regulators and market intermediaries are poorly 
situated to police innovation in proprietary forms that significantly 
depart from ISO forms. Whereas ISO forms operate as a single point 
of focus because of their historical dominance in homeowners 
insurance markets, individual insurers are often able to escape 
rigorous regulatory and market scrutiny of their policy forms.187 
This is because many, if not most, state insurance regulators simply 
do not have the resources to carefully review and understand  
the implications of numerous different individual carriers’ 
company-specific forms.188 It is one thing to carefully review a 
handful of changes to the long-dominant industry form with which 
regulators have worked for decades; it is quite another to review 
changes to numerous different companies’ individual forms, which 
have their own unique structure and internal logic.  
The different levels of scrutiny that ISO policy revisions and 
revisions to individual insurers’ proprietary policies receive are 
even more stark when it comes to market intermediaries. 
Individual insurers’ changes to their proprietary forms are largely 
invisible to most market actors: these changes are not typically 
covered by industry periodicals or taught in classes for industry 
professionals.189 In fact, it is incredibly difficult even to secure 
copies of individual insurers’ proprietary forms, which carriers do 
not generally make available online or allow to be reprinted in 
industry sources.190 Additionally, very few people—including 
many insurance agents—know how each of these proprietary 
 
 187. See generally Schwarcz, Reevaluating, supra note 7, at 1318–37 (outlining the 
difficulty in obtaining company-specific forms). 
 188. See BIPARTISAN POL’Y CTR., IMPROVING U.S. INSURANCE REGULATION 18–19 (2017). 
 189. See generally Schwarcz, Reevaluating, supra note 7, at 1328–37 (discussing the lack 
of available information regarding the content of individual insurers’ proprietary policies). 
 190. See Schwarcz, Transparently Opaque, supra note 164, at 425–26. See generally 
RUTGERS CTR. FOR RISK & RESP., ESSENTIAL PROTECTIONS FOR POLICYHOLDERS 10–17 (2019), 
https://epp.law.rutgers.edu/sites/epp/files/EPP-full-2019_0.pdf (recommending taking 
action to protect consumers and provide online resources); RUTGERS CTR. FOR RISK & RESP., 
ESSENTIAL PROTECTION FOR POLICYHOLDERS STATE RANKINGS OF HOMEOWNERS INSURANCE 
PROTECTIONS: BUYING INSURANCE (2017), https://epp.law.rutgers.edu/sites/epp/files/ 
EPP%20Buying%20insurance.pdf (finding that “[o]nly five states make homeowners 
insurance policy forms available online” and “[a]bout a dozen states provide some tool that 
consumers can use to compare policy terms”). 
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policy forms differ from the ISO HO3 policy.191 For these reasons, 
market and regulatory forces do much less to effectively constrain 
change to these company-specific forms than to the ISO 
HO3 policy.  
Insurers’ increasing use of proprietary forms that depart 
significantly from the ISO standard creates numerous market 
problems even apart from their tendency to systematically reduce 
coverage in ways that consumers do not understand. Most 
importantly, varying policy forms undermine the extent to which 
consumers can make trade-offs on issues about which they are 
relatively informed, like price and customer service.192 This is 
because they prevent consumers from making apples-to-apples 
comparisons among competing carriers.193 Meanwhile, such 
variety does not plausibly promote meaningful consumer tradeoffs 
between coverage and price nor enhance efficient contractual 
innovation precisely because so few policyholders have even a 
rudimentary understanding of whether their insurance policy 
departs from ISO language and, if so, the implications of these 
departures. Varying policy forms also undermine the capacity of 
consumers, regulators, and market intermediaries to develop and 
communicate clear understandings of what is and is not covered by 
homeowners insurance; although innumerable sources provide 
generalized answers to this question, most specific coverage 
questions can only be answered by explaining that “it depends on 
your policy language.”194 
States should respond to these vast differences in the evolution 
of ISO consumer-oriented insurance policies and company-specific 
proprietary policies by considering the very same solution that they 
adopted over a century ago—when they required fire insurers to 
offer coverage that was no less generous than that contained within 
a standard policy.195 These rules have become largely obsolete as a 
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result of the evolution of the bundled homeowners policy, which 
provides protection from numerous perils in addition to fire, as 
well as liability protection.196 By elevating ISO homeowners 
insurance policies from presumptive and historical default into a 
legally-required minimum floor of coverage, states could 
reinvigorate this historical solution to the problem of varying 
policy forms that hollow out coverage.197 And they could do so by 
piggy-backing on the various benefits of judicially prompted 
innovation of the ISO HO3 form.198 
To be sure, there are plausible objections to completely 
standardizing homeowners insurance policies. For instance, doing 
so would indeed limit choice for the small segment of consumers 
who trade off coverage terms and price when shopping for 
coverage. This concern is partly addressed by allowing insurers to 
provide more expansive coverage than the ISO HO3 policy, but this 
would not address the preferences of consumers who would 
choose less expansive coverage for lower premiums. Another 
potential concern is that converting the ISO HO3 policy form into a 
state-required minimum could complicate ISO’s revision process 
while empowering a private company to set legal standards. Here 
too, however, there is at least a partial solution: state law could 
require insurers to offer coverage at least as generous as a specific 
version of the ISO HO3 policy rather than dynamically 
incorporating by reference updated versions of the policy that were 
produced after the law’s passage.199 Doing so would ensure that 
state legislatures, rather than just the ISO, would have to 
affirmatively approve changes to the HO3 policy before those 
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B. The Varied and Context-Specific Role of Courts in the Evolution of 
Form Contracts 
Aside from its implications for insurance law, this Article’s 
results also help to advance the burgeoning empirical literature on 
contractual innovation.200 First, the results suggest that while 
standard form contracts may be resistant to change in many 
domains, this result is hardly inevitable. Although the evolution of 
the homeowners insurance policy has surely been gradual—
spanning well over fifty years—it has also been relatively 
responsive to court cases.201 Moreover, the various instances when 
homeowners insurance policies have not changed in response to 
relevant court cases are best understood as an affirmative decision 
by insurers to expand coverage, rather than as evidence of 
irrational contractual stickiness.202  
Perhaps not surprisingly, this pattern of innovation in 
homeowners insurance policies is more consistent with evidence 
regarding the evolution of consumer contracts than sophisticated 
commercial contracts. As discussed in Part I, sophisticated financial 
instruments like sovereign bond contracts often exhibit patterns of 
prolonged stickiness paired with sudden change prompted by 
mass herding to new terms.203 By contrast, innovation in the most 
closely studied, consumer-oriented form contracts—EULAs—
appears to be relatively robust. This is especially true when firms 
can observe the impact of policy language through judicial 
decisions or changes in consumer behavior.204 Because virtually all 
terms in homeowners policies fit this description, the patterns of 
innovation exhibited by the ISO HO3 policy are consistent with 
these findings. 
The emerging evidence thus suggests that, other things being 
equal, consumer contracts are more likely than sophisticated 
commercial contracts to exhibit gradual but persistent innovation, 
particularly with respect to relevant caselaw. This possibility can be 
explained in a variety of ways from a theoretical perspective. For 
instance, drafters of consumer-oriented contracts may be relatively 
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less worried about the potential signaling effect of revising contract 
terms, as most consumers are unlikely to be responsive to these 
types of signals given that they do not read contracts in the first 
place. Alternatively, drafters of consumer contracts may not 
internalize the benefits of contract standardization across time, 
which principally benefits consumers. Yet another possibility is 
that free-riding on contract innovation is easier to overcome in the 
context of consumer-oriented contracts, as consumer-facing firms 
tend not to compete with one another based on contract terms.  
The divergent evolution of the ISO HO3 policy and individual 
insurers’ proprietary policies also helps to shed light on the 
direction and impact of innovation in consumer-oriented contracts. 
As with innovation of EULA contracts, revisions to homeowners 
policies have tended to result in longer and more complex 
contracts.205 But while changes to both EULA terms and proprietary 
homeowners policies tended to be pro-seller, the impact of 
innovation in the ISO HO3 policy was more balanced between 
consumer and seller interests. Consistent with the substantial 
theoretical literature on the efficiency of standard form contracts,206 
these trends tend to suggest that innovation of consumer forms is 
more likely to be balanced to the extent that this innovation can be 
easily policed by informed and unbiased consumers, market 
intermediaries, and government actors. As suggested earlier, such 
policing is much more difficult when it comes to heterogeneous 
consumer contracts that are crafted by individual firms than when 
it comes to a single, dominant form contract that is the presumptive 
industry default, like the ISO HO3 policy.207 
CONCLUSION 
Homeowners insurance policies are among the most important 
standard form consumer contracts in the United States. The 
historical dominance of one particular version of this contract—the 
ISO HO3 policy—offers a unique opportunity to understand how 
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this contract has evolved over time. Meanwhile, the relatively 
recent tendency of several large, national insurers to depart from 
this standard form offers unique insights into how consumer 
contracts evolve under different market and institutional 
conditions. Exploiting these elements of the homeowners insurance 
market, this Article demonstrates that the ISO HO3 policy has 
evolved consistently over time in response to caselaw, in ways that 
largely promote the joint interests of insurers and consumers. By 
contrast, insurers that have jettisoned the ISO form in favor of 
divergent proprietary policies have tended to revise their policies 
to systematically restrict coverage. These divergent paths offer 
important lessons both for insurance law and for the burgeoning 
empirical literature on contract innovation. 
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